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This article provides an in-depth look at Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-
14(g)(6)(ii), known as the proceeds regulation. The proceeds regulation is intended 
to protect the public investment in conservation if a perpetual conservation 
easement that was the subject of a charitable deduction under Internal Revenue 
Code § 170(h) is later extinguished. A proper understanding of the proceeds 
regulation is critical because the public investment in deductible easements is 
significant—billions of dollars are being invested in such easements annually—and 
the regulation has recently been subject to challenges regarding its interpretation 
and validity. This article examines the history and operation of the proceeds 
regulation as well as possible alternatives. It explains that the proceeds regulation 
provides a simple and easy-to-implement rule that avoids a host of future valuation 
difficulties. It demonstrates that the proceeds regulation is neither irrational nor 
inherently unfair to donors or subsequent property owners, and serves to temper 
the perverse incentive that property owners may have to seek to extinguish 
easements. This article concludes that the proceeds regulation provides a 
reasonable solution to the difficult problem of ensuring that the conservation 
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In the late 1970s, Congress experimented with the idea of authorizing a 
federal charitable income tax deduction for the donation of conservation easements 
that were temporary in nature. However, Congress quickly gave up on that 
experiment as wasteful of taxpayer dollars and ill-advised as a matter of 
conservation policy. Accordingly, in enacting Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 
170(h) in 1980, Congress limited the deduction to the donation of perpetual 
conservation easements—those that are intended to permanently protect the 
conservation attributes of the parcels they encumber. Specifically, Congress 
required that a deductible easement be “granted in perpetuity,” and that “the 
conservation purpose [of the contribution be] protected in perpetuity.”1  
Subsidization of perpetual conservation easements through the deduction 
program raised a number of important questions, not the least of which was how to 
address the possibility of a state court extinguishment of an easement if the purpose 
of the easement became impossible or impractical to accomplish due to changed 
conditions. Congress chose not to address that issue in § 170(h). Instead, it left it to 
the Treasury to develop a regulation to ensure that, in the event of an 
extinguishment, the conservation purpose of the contribution would nonetheless be 
protected in perpetuity. The Treasury, for its part, promulgated Treasury Regulation 
§ 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i)-(ii), referred to as the “extinguishment regulation,” which 
addresses the limited circumstances under which a deductible perpetual 
conservation easement can be extinguished and the manner in which the nonprofit 
or government donee must be compensated for loss of the easement.  
 
1 I.R.C. § 170(h)(2)(C), (h)(5)(A). 
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This article focuses on the compensation component of the extinguishment 
regulation, referred to as the “proceeds regulation,” and the controversy over its 
interpretation and validity. The proceeds regulation mandates that, if a deductible 
conservation easement is extinguished—which requires a judicial proceeding and 
a finding that continued use of the subject property for conservation purposes has 
become impossible or impractical—the nonprofit or government donee must be 
entitled to at least a minimum percentage of the proceeds from a subsequent sale, 
exchange, or involuntary conversion of the property (the “post-extinguishment 
proceeds”).2 The minimum percentage is based on the value of the easement 
relative to the value of the property as a whole at the time of the easement’s 
donation.3 The extinguishment regulation provides that the donee must use its 
percentage of post-extinguishment proceeds in a manner consistent with the 
conservation purposes of the original contribution.4  
The foregoing requirements seem sensible. By providing that the donee 
must receive compensation if an easement is extinguished, and must use that 
compensation to advance similar conservation purposes elsewhere, the 
extinguishment regulation protects the investment the public made in conservation 
through the deduction program. The devil, however, is in the details. 
In a number of recent cases, deductions were denied because the 
conservation easement deeds provided for the value attributable to improvements 
constructed on the property following the donation to be subtracted from any post-
extinguishment proceeds before calculating the donee’s minimum percentage 
share.5 Taxpayers have objected to those holdings, arguing that the proceeds 
regulation should be interpreted to permit subtraction of the value attributable to 
 
2 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i)-(ii). 
3 Id. 
4 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i).  
5 See PBBM-Rose Hill, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 900 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2018); Coal Prop. Holdings, 
LLC v. Commissioner, 153 T.C. 126 (2019); TOT Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Bench Op. (Dec. 13, 2019); Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-
54, Hewitt v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-89; Plateau Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 2020-93; Lumpkin One Five Six, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-94; Lumpkin HC, 
LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-95; Vill. at Effingham, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
2020-102; Riverside Place, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-103, Maple Landing, LLC v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-104; Englewood Place, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-
105; Smith Lake, LLC, v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-107; Belair Woods, LLC v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-112; Cottonwood Place, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
2020-115; Red Oak Estates, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-116; Glade Creek Partners, 
LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-148. In some of the cases, the conservation easement deeds 
also called for the subtraction of any post-donation appreciation in the value of improvements that 
had existed on the property at the time of the donation. See, e.g., Coal Prop. Holdings, 153 T.C. 
126; Plateau Holdings, T.C. Memo. 2020-93; Belair Woods, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
2020-112. 
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improvements or, alternatively, that the regulation should be deemed procedurally 
or substantively invalid.6 They have argued that it is unfair and irrational for the 
donee of a conservation easement to be entitled to a percentage of the proceeds 
attributable to, for example, a million-dollar home that the donor or a subsequent 
property owner constructed on the property following the donation. They maintain 
that such a rule amounts to donors and subsequent property owners making 
unintended charitable contributions for which they receive no deduction.7  
While those arguments have surface appeal, they are simplistic and ignore 
important realities. This article provides an in-depth look at the history and 
operation of the proceeds regulation, as well as possible alternatives. It 
demonstrates that the proceeds regulation is not inherently unfair to donors or 
subsequent property owners, nor is it irrational. A variety of unpredictable variables 
can affect the amount of post-extinguishment proceeds to be divided between the 
parties and, depending on the facts, the regulation can financially benefit donors 
and subsequent property owners. There also are a number of rationale bases for the 
formula in the regulation. For example, not subtracting the value attributable to 
improvements from post-extinguishment proceeds before calculating the donee’s 
percentage share can temper the perverse incentive property owners may have to 
seek extinguishment when an easement has appreciated in value relative to the 
value of the property as a whole. The formula in the proceeds regulation is also 
simple, easy-to-implement, and avoids significant future valuation difficulties that, 
as a practical matter, would likely be addressed in a manner that would enrich 
property owners at the public’s expense.  
This article also addresses a number of other issues that are important to a 
full understanding of the proceeds regulation. It explains why a voluntarily donated 
 
6 See, e.g., Oakbrook Land Holdings, T.C. Memo. 2020-54 (Oakbrook I) and Oakbrook Land 
Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, 154 T.C. No. 10 (2020) (Oakbrook II), which are on appeal in in 
the Sixth Circuit, and Hewitt, T.C. Memo. 2020-89, which is on appeal in the Eleventh Circuit. In 
Oakbrook II, a majority of the Tax Court, consisting of twelve judges, held that the proceeds 
regulation was properly promulgated under the Administrative Procedure Act (procedurally valid) 
and not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute” (substantively valid). Oakbrook 
Land Holdings, 154 T.C. No. 10. In Mitchell v. Commissioner, 775 F.3d 1243, 1248 (10th Cir. 
2015), the Tenth Circuit held that the mortgage subordination regulation was substantively valid, 
explaining: 
where Congress has delegated to the Commissioner the power to promulgate regulations 
for the enforcement of the Code, ‘we must defer to his regulatory interpretations of the 
Code so long as they are reasonable’… Here, the relevant regulations [Treasury 
Regulations § 1.170A-14(g)(1)-(6)], specifically the mortgage subordination provision, 
represent the Commissioner’s reasoned efforts to implement the Code’s requirement that 
‘[a] contribution shall not be treated as exclusively for conservation purposes unless the 
conservation purpose is protected in perpetuity.’ 
7 See, e.g., Oakbrook Land Holding, LLCs, T.C. Memo. 2020-54, at *38; Smith Lake, LLC, v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-107, at *11-*12.  
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conservation easement that satisfies the conditions imposed on the deduction does 
not infringe on the state law property rights of the donor or a subsequent property 
owner. It discusses the interaction between the proceeds regulation and laws 
governing apportionment of condemnation awards, as well as the incorrect notion 
that a conservation easement encumbers only the underlying land and not the 
improvements thereon. It explains that the proceeds regulation establishes a bright-
line rule and the IRS and the courts should not be required to engage in a case-by-
case, fact-specific, and inherently speculative inquiry into whether future 
improvements would add value to a property. Also addressed is the unfortunate 
misconception that, in enforcing the requirements of § 170(h) and the Treasury 
Regulations, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is “attacking” conservation 
easement donations.8 The attack on conservation easements is not coming from the 
IRS; it is coming from those who seek to take advantage of the § 170(h) deduction 
while avoiding the conditions Congress imposed on the deduction to protect the 
public interest and prevent abuse.  
It is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate the procedural or substantive 
validity of the proceeds regulation. However, the analysis herein will inform an 
assessment of whether the regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary 
to the statutory requirement that the conservation purpose of a contribution be 
protected in perpetuity.9  
The importance of a proper understanding of the proceeds regulation cannot 
be overstated. The proceeds regulation protects the investment being made by the 
public in conservation through the § 170(h) deduction program and that investment 
is significant. The annual revenue loss from the deduction is in the billions of 
dollars, and the deduction program ranks among the largest federal environmental 
and land management programs in the U.S. budget.10 As of 2016, it was estimated 
that we were spending almost as much on deductible conservation easements as on 
the entire National Park System.11 Given that level of investment, it is crucial that 
the rules governing its protection are sound and cannot be subverted by donors or 
 
8 See infra Part IV.D.  
9 See I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(A); supra note 6.  
10 Adam Looney, Estimating the Rising Cost of a Surprising Tax Shelter: The Syndicated 
Conservation Easement, Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center (Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/12/20/estimating-the-rising-cost-of-a-surprising-
tax-shelter-the-syndicated-conservation-easement/. See also Syndicated Conservation-Easement 
Transactions, Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Bipartisan Investigative Report, S. Prt. 
116-44, at 2-3 (Aug. 2020), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SFC%20-
%20Syndicated%20Conservation-Easement%20Transactions.pdf [hereinafter, Senate Finance 
Committee Bipartisan Investigative Report]; Roger Colinvaux, Conservation Easements: Design 
Flaws, Enforcement Challenges, and Reform, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 755, 756 (2013), 
https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar/107/.  
11  Looney, supra note 10. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3760530
 6 
subsequent property owners. It also is important to minimize the possibility that 
property owners will have a financial incentive to seek the extinguishment of 
easements. 
This article proceeds as follows. Part II provides some necessary 
background. It explains the status of the § 170(h) deduction as an exception to the 
general prohibition on charitable deductions for donations of partial interests in 
property. It outlines the strict limits that Congress and the Treasury imposed on the 
deduction to ensure public benefit and prevent abuse. It also provides a brief history 
of the extinguishment regulation. Part III examines the operation of the proceeds 
regulation and possible alternatives. It illustrates that the regulation is neither unfair 
nor irrational. Part IV addresses the additional issues that are important to a full 
understanding of the proceeds regulation. Part V concludes that, properly 
understood, the proceeds regulation provides a reasonable solution to the difficult 
problem of ensuring that the conservation purpose of a contribution will be 
protected in perpetuity.  
 
II. THE § 170(H) DEDUCTION 
 
A. Partial Interest Donation 
 
In 1969 Congress adopted a general prohibition on charitable income tax 
deductions for donations of partial interests in property.12 Partial interest donations 
are disfavored because they often involve abusive arrangements in which the 
donors retain extensive control over the property and the public receives little 
benefit.13 Congress made an exception to this general prohibition for conservation 
easement donations when it enacted section 170(h) in 1980.14 However, Congress 
imposed strict limits on the deduction to prevent abuse and ensure that the public 




12 Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201; I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(A). 
13 See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, Incentives for Conservation Easements: The Charitable Deduction or 
A Better Way, 74 DUKE J. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 31-33 (2011), 
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1644&context=lcp; Colinvaux, supra 
note 10 at 757-758. 
14 See Colinvaux, supra note 10, at 755; I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(b)(iii), (h). See also Belk v. 
Commissioner, 774 F.3d 221 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The Code generally restricts a taxpayer’s ability to 
claim a charitable deduction for the donation of ‘an interest in property which consists of less than 
the taxpayer’s entire interest in such property.’… But it provides an exception to the general rule 
for ‘a qualified conservation contribution’”). 
15 See S. Rep. 96-1007, at 9, 10-14 (1980) (providing an in-depth explanation of congressional intent 
regarding  § 170(h) and its requirements). 
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That the easement deduction was born as an exception to the partial interest 
rule is critical to its design. Congress could simply have waived the partial 
interest rules and left conservation easements to be treated like any other 
contribution of real property. . . . A donor could arrange for a conservation 
easement on property and contribute the easement to any charity for any 
reason, and a fair market value deduction would be available. This is, after 
all, how it normally works — with the oversight role of the IRS generally 
limited to checking value. 
 
But . . . Congress took a different approach and adopted a number of special 
rules intended to address potential (and anticipated) problems.16 
 
B. The Special Rules 
 
To be eligible for a federal charitable income tax deduction under section 
170(h), the donor of a conservation easement must comply with each of the 
following requirements: (1) the easement must be a qualified real property interest, 
defined as “a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of 
the real property”;17 (2) the easement must be contributed to a qualified 
organization, defined to include a government entity or public-supported charity or 
a subsidiary thereof;18 (3) the contribution must satisfy one or more of four 
conservation purposes tests;19 and (4) the contribution must be made “exclusively” 
for one or more of the four conservation purposes, meaning the conservation 
purpose of the contribution must be protected in perpetuity.20 
To satisfy the conservation purposes test, a deductible conservation 
easement must be contributed for one or more of the following purposes: (1) 
preservation of land for outdoor recreation by, or education of, the general public; 
(2) protection of a relatively natural habitat; (3) preservation of open space for the 
scenic enjoyment of the general public or pursuant to a clearly delineated 
governmental conservation policy, provided the preservation will yield a significant 
public benefit; or (4) preservation of a historically important land area or 
structure.21 
 
16 Colinvaux, supra note 10, at 758. See also STEPHEN J. SMALL, THE FEDERAL TAX LAW OF 
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS, 2-2—2-3 (1997) (“A taxpayer who donates an easement continues to 
use and enjoy the property, and the requirements for taking an income tax deduction simply must 
be tighter to ensure that there is also a significant long-term public benefit associated with the 
donation”). 
17 I.R.C. § 170(h)(1)(A), (h)(2)(C). 
18 Id. § 170(h)(1)(B), (h)(3). 
19 Id. § 170(h)(1)(C), (h)(4). 
20 Id. § 170(h)(1)(C), (h)(5)(A). 
21 Id. § 170(h)(4)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d). 
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For the conservation purpose of a contribution to be protected in perpetuity, 
the donation must comply with the no-surface-mining requirement in § 
170(h)(5)(B) and each of the following regulations:22 the eligible donee 
regulation;23 the restriction-on-transfer regulation;24 the no-inconsistent-use 
regulation;25 the general enforceable-in-perpetuity regulation;26 the mortgage 
subordination regulation;27 the future defeating events regulation;28 the mining 
restrictions regulation;29 the baseline documentation regulation;30 the donee notice, 
donee access, and donee enforcement regulations;31 and the extinguishment 
regulation.32 The no-surface-mining requirement and the foregoing regulations 
other than the extinguishment regulation are intended to ensure that the 
conservation purpose of a contribution will be carried out through the conservation 
easement in perpetuity or forever.33 The extinguishment regulation specifies the 
limited circumstances under which an extinguishment can occur.34 
To be eligible for the § 170(h) deduction, the donor of a conservation 
easement also must substantiate the value of the easement by obtaining a qualified 
appraisal.35 A qualified appraisal must, among other things, be prepared by a 
qualified appraiser and in accordance with generally accepted appraisal standards.36 
The appraisal also must comply with a number of special rules applicable to 
conservation easements.37 
 
22 See I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(1); S. Rep. No. 96-1007, at 13-14. The 
mortgage subordination regulation applies only if the property is subject to a mortgage on the date 
of the gift of the easement. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(2). Although the baseline documentation 
and donee notice, access, and enforcement regulations are applicable only if the donor “reserves 
rights the [improper] exercise of which may impair the conservation interests associated with the 
property,” donors almost always reserve such rights, so those requirements apply to most easements. 
Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(5). 
23 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1). 
24 Id. § 1.170A-14(c)(2). 
25 Id. § 1.170A-14(e)(2)-(3). 
26 Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(1). 
27 Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(2). 
28 Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(3). 
29 Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(4). 
30 Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i). 
31 Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(ii). 
32 Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i)-(ii). 
33 See, e.g., Hoffman Properties II LP v. Commissioner, 956 F.3d 832, 833 (6th Cir. 2020) 
(perpetuity means “time without end; eternity” and in perpetuity means “endless duration; forever”). 
34 See infra Part II.C. 
35 Under  IRC § 170((f)(11)(C), taxpayers are required to obtain a qualified appraisal for donated 
property for which a deduction of more than $5,000 is claimed. See also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-
14(i) and (j); -16(d)(1)(ii); -17(a)(1). 
36 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(1). For the definition of a “qualified appraiser”, see Treasury 
Regulation § 1.170A-17((b)(1). 
37 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i). 
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None of the foregoing requirements are optional. Congress and the Treasury 
considered each of the requirements to be critical to the integrity and effectiveness 
of the deduction program. Each requirement must be satisfied at the time of a 
conservation easement’s donation, and compliance is indirectly policed by the IRS, 
through the tax return review and audit process, and the courts, if the issue is 
litigated.38 In addition, deduction requirements are generally strictly construed.39 
 
C. History of the Extinguishment Regulation 
 
Prior to enacting § 170(h) in 1980, Congress briefly experimented with the 
idea of allowing deductions for donations of conservation easements that were 
temporary in nature. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 provided the first statutory 
authority for charitable deductions for conservation easement donations and it 
authorized deductions for the donation of both perpetual easements and term 
easements with a minimum term of 30 years.40 However, land conservation groups 
such as The Nature Conservancy expressed concern that term easements would not 
effectively promote conservation goals.41 They believed that term easements would 
merely allow development pressures to build up over thirty years, at which time the 
pressure to develop would be irresistible.42 They also were concerned that allowing 
 
38 See, e.g., Palmolive Building Investors LLC v Commissioner, 149 T.C. 380, 405 (2017) (“The 
requirements of section 170 must be satisfied at the time of the gift.”); Oakbrook Land Holdings, 
LLC v. Commissioner, 154 T.C. No. 10 (2020) (“Congress specified numerous requirements for a 
“‘qualified conservation contribution,’” including the requirements that the contribution be made 
“‘exclusively for conservation purposes’” and that the “‘conservation purpose [be] protected in 
perpetuity.’”). 
39 See INDOPCO Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) (an income tax deduction is a matter 
of legislative grace and “deductions are strictly construed”). Several circuit courts have applied 
INDOPCO to § 170(h). See Minnick v. Commissioner, 796 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2015); Belk v. 
Commissioner, 774 F.3d 221, 225 (4th Cir. 2014); Scheidelman v. Commissioner, 755 F.3d 148, 
154 (2d Cir. 2014); Esgar Corp. v. Commissioner, 744 F.3d 648, 653 (10th Cir. 2014). See also 
Glass v. Commissioner, 471 F.3d 698, 706 (6th Cir. 2006); RP Golf v. Commissioner, 860 F.3d 
1096, 1100 (8th Cir. 2017). Contra BC Ranch II v. Commissioner, 867 F.3d 547, 553-554 (5th Cir. 
2017). There was a strong and persuasive dissent on this point (and others) in BC Ranch. See id. at 
560-561. For a helpful history of court construction of deduction provisions and support for strictly 
interpreting § 170(h)’s perpetuity requirements, see Bryan Camp, Lesson From The Tax Court: Not 
Stopping The Perpetual Debate About Conservation Easements, TaxProf Blog, 
https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2018/09/lesson-from-the-tax-court-no-stopping-the-
perpetual-debate-about-conservatio.html (accessed Dec. 7, 2020). 
40 Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1919, § 2124(e) (1976). 
41 See Stephen J. Small, The Tax Benefits of Donating Easements on Scenic and Historic Property, 
7 REAL EST. L.J. 304, 315–16 (1979). 
42 Id. 
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deductions for term easements would discourage the donation of perpetual 
easements.43  
Allowing a deduction for term conservation easements was also ill-advised 
from a tax policy standpoint because it provided an expensive subsidy to taxpayers 
making long-term investments in land held for eventual development. Under the 
1976 legislation, an investor making a 30-year investment in land on the urbanizing 
fringe of a metropolitan region could receive a deduction for donating an easement 
that would do little or nothing to advance conservation goals, given that the investor 
did not intend to develop the land for thirty years in any event. Such a deduction 
merely reduced the carrying costs of that type of investment. 
Accordingly, Congress quickly dropped the idea of temporary easements as 
wasteful of taxpayer dollars and ill-advised as a matter of conservation policy. In 
the Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Congress limited the deduction 
to the donation of conservation easements that were granted in perpetuity.44 
Congress then stuck to this policy when it made the conservation easement 
deduction provision a permanent part of the Code in 1980 in the form of § 170(h), 
and it included a new requirement—that the conservation purpose of the 
contribution must be protected in perpetuity.45 Congress thus made a carefully 
considered judgment not to authorize a deduction for the donation of temporary 
easements and, instead, to require that deductible easements permanently protect 
the parcels they encumber.46  
Congress was aware, however, of the possible extinguishment of perpetual 
conservation easements by state courts due to changed conditions. In anticipation 
of a congressional hearing on proposed new § 170(h), the Joint Committee on 
Taxation prepared a report in which it specifically raised the question of whether § 
170(h) ought to include rules to cover the situation “where a transferred partial 
interest in real property, for which a deduction was allowed because it served a 
conservation purpose, ceases to be used in furtherance of the conservation 
 
43 Id. at 304, 306. 
44 Pub. L. 95-30, 91. Stat. 154, § 309 (1977). 
45 Pub. L. No. 96–541, 94 Stat. at 3206, § 6(a). 
46 In the legislative history of § 170(h), the Senate Finance Committee explained that, to satisfy the 
new “protected in perpetuity” requirement, among other things, the perpetual restrictions in a 
deductible conservation easement must be “enforceable by the donee organization (and successors 
in interest) against all other parties in interest (including successors in interest)” and the easement 
must “not be transferable by the donee except to other qualified organizations that also will hold the 
[easement] exclusively for conservation purposes.” S. Rep. No 96-1007, at 14. See also Graev v. 
Commissioner, 140 T.C. 377 (2013) (“In the Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1980 … Congress 
amended section 170(f)(3) and added subsection [170](h), which have remained in effect since then 
and work in tandem to keep the perpetuity requirement for conservation easement donations”). 
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purpose.”47 In response to that question, the president of a prominent land trust, on 
behalf of nineteen land trusts, advised:  
 
We believe that with a well planned easement program this is most unlikely 
to occur, but it is not impossible. It is conceivable for example, that a farm, 
or a natural habitat, might become so closely surrounded by heavy industry 
at some future time that it would become impossible to continue the original 
conservation purpose. In such a situation the then owner of the land might, 
under common law “change of circumstances” doctrine, obtain equitable 
relief from the burden of the easement in court. Certainly if that were to 
happen equity would seem to call for a return to the public of the price 
originally paid for the public benefit provided by the easement, whether that 
price had been paid directly by purchase or indirectly by a tax deduction. It 
also seems very difficult, however, to provide for this unlikely occurrence 
in the Revenue Code itself. We would hope that some Regulation for this 
purpose could be developed by those most interested, i.e., The Revenue 
Service and the Treasury Department, which would not interfere with the 
main operation of the easement program.48 
 
Congress did not include standards and procedures governing 
extinguishment of deductible easements in the event of changed conditions in § 
170(h), leaving it to the Treasury to address that issue in regulations. The Treasury 
did so by crafting the extinguishment regulation, which is part of the final 
regulations interpreting § 170(h) that were issued in 1986. The extinguishment 
regulation provides as follows:  
 
In general. If a subsequent unexpected change in the conditions surrounding 
the property that is the subject of a donation under this paragraph can make 
impossible or impractical the continued use of the property for conservation 
purposes, the conservation purpose can nonetheless be treated as protected 
in perpetuity if the restrictions are extinguished by judicial proceeding and 
all of the donee's proceeds [determined as provided in the following 
paragraph] from a subsequent sale or exchange of the property are used by 
 
47 Staff of J. Comm. on Taxation, 96th Cong., Description of Miscellaneous Tax Bills Scheduled for 
a Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the Committee on Ways and 
Means on June 26, 1980, JCS-33-80, at 27 (Comm. Print 1980) (providing a list of seven issues that 
were raised by the bill to enact section 170(h)). 
48 Minor Tax Bills: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. 
on Ways and Means, 96th Cong. 238, 245 (1980) (written statement of Samuel W. Morris, President, 
French and Pickering Creeks Conservation Trust, Inc., Pottstown, Pa., July 1, 1980, submitted on 
behalf of nineteen land trusts). 
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the donee organization in a manner consistent with the conservation 
purposes of the original contribution.49  
 
Proceeds. At the time of the gift the donor must agree that the donation of 
the [easement]50 gives rise to a property right, immediately vested in the 
donee organization, with a fair market value that is at least equal to the 
proportionate value that the [easement] at the time of the gift, bears to the 
value of the property as a whole at that time. . . . [T]hat proportionate value 
of the donee's property rights shall remain constant. Accordingly, when a 
change in conditions give rise to the extinguishment of [an easement] [as 
provided in the preceding paragraph], the donee organization, on a 
subsequent sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion of the subject 
property, must be entitled to a portion of the proceeds at least equal to that 
proportionate value of the [easement], unless state law provides that the 
donor is entitled to the full proceeds from the conversion without regard to 
the terms of the prior [easement].51  
 
The first paragraph of the extinguishment regulation—referred to herein as 
the judicial proceeding regulation—limits extinguishment to “‘unexpected’ and 
extraordinary circumstances”; a deductible perpetual conservation easement can be 
extinguished only when it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of a court that 
changed conditions have made continued use of the property for conservation 
purposes impossible or impractical.52 This limitation carries out Congress’s 
directive in § 170(h)(2)(C) that a deductible conservation easement be “a restriction 
(granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the real property.”53 That 
is, a deductible easement must protect the conservation interests associated with the 
real property it encumbers “in perpetuity” or forever, unless an unexpected change 
in conditions makes it impossible or impractical to continue to do so.54 
The second paragraph of the extinguishment regulation—the proceeds 
regulation——mandates that, in the event of an extinguishment, the donee must be 
 
49 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i). 
50 The regulations use the term “perpetual conservation restriction” in lieu of conservation easement. 
To avoid confusion and for brevity purposes, this article uses the terms conservation easement and 
easement. 
51 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii). 
52 See Belk v. Commissioner, 774 F.3d 221, 225 (4th Cir. 2014) (“absent these ‘unexpected’ and 
extraordinary circumstances, real property placed under easement must remain there in perpetuity 
in order for the donor of the easement to claim a charitable deduction”). 
53 See id. at 227 (§ 170(h)(2)(C)’s “granted in perpetuity” requirement “means what it says: a 
charitable deduction may be claimed for the donation of a conservation easement only when that 
easement restricts the use of the donated property in perpetuity”). 
54 See id. See also supra note 33. 
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entitled to at least a minimum proportionate share of post-extinguishment proceeds, 
and the judicial proceeding regulation requires that those proceeds be used in a 
manner consistent with the conservation purposes of the original contribution. 
Those provisions are intended to carry out Congress’s directive in § 170(h)(5)(A) 
that “the conservation purpose [of the contribution be] protected in perpetuity” in 
the event that an easement is extinguished.55 That is, if the conservation purpose of 
a contribution can no longer be carried out through the perpetual easement due to 
an unexpected change in conditions, the conservation purpose must nonetheless 
continue to be carried out through the donee’s use of proceeds to advance similar 
conservation purposes elsewhere.56 
The extinguishment regulation appears to have been modeled on the 
doctrine of cy pres, which applies to perpetual charitable gifts.57 Looking to the  
doctrine of cy pres rather than the real property law doctrine of changed conditions 
in this context makes sense. Deductible conservation easements are, by definition, 
charitable gifts that are granted for specific purposes in perpetuity,58 and both 
Congress and the Treasury were aware of the rules governing perpetual charitable 
gifts when § 170(h) was enacted. At the congressional hearings on proposed § 
170(h), and in response to the Treasury’s concern that charitable conservation 
organizations might not properly enforce conservation easements, nineteen land 
trusts submitted an appendix to their testimony in which they acknowledged the 
status of deductible easements as “charitable grants” and noted the power and duty 
of courts and state attorneys general to enforce such grants.59 Because of their status 
as charitable grants, the terms of deductible conservation easements, including the 
 
55 See supra Part II.B, discussing the protected-in-perpetuity requirement. 
56 See Coal Property Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, 153 T.C. 126, at *136 (2019) (“the [protected 
in] ‘perpetuity’ requirement is deemed satisfied because the sale proceeds replace the easement as 
an asset deployed by the donee ‘exclusively for conservation purposes.’”); Kaufman v. Shulman, 
687 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2012) (the extinguishment regulation “appears designed in case of 
extinguishment both (1) to prevent taxpayers from reaping a windfall if the property is destroyed or 
condemned and they get the proceeds from insurance or condemnation and (2) to assure that the 
donee organization can use its proportionate share of the proceeds to advance the cause of historic 
preservation elsewhere”).  
57 See Kaufman v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. No. 13, *9 (2011) (the extinguishment regulation 
“appears to be a regulatory version of cy pres”), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Kaufman 
v. Shulman, 687 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2012).  
58 See I.R.C. § 170(h)(1)(A) (requiring a charitable “contribution” of a qualified real property 
interest to a qualified organization exclusively for conservation purposes). See also Carpenter v. 
Commissioner,  T.C. Memo. 2012-1, at *2 (“A charitable contribution is a gift of property to a 
charitable organization, made with charitable intent and without the receipt or expectation of receipt 
of adequate consideration.”). 
59 See Minor Tax Bills: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House 
Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong. 238, 242 (1980) (App. to Testimony of French and 
Pickering Creeks Conservation Trust, the Brandywine Conservancy, and other Conservation 
Organizations in re H.R. 7318 on June 26, 1980). 
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terms specifying the limited circumstances under which the easements can be 
extinguished, should be binding on both the property owner and the donee under 
state law.60 That is, property owners and donees should not be able to mutually 
agree to extinguish easements. In addition, under the doctrine of cy pres, in the 
event of impossibility or impracticality, a court will direct that the charitable asset, 
or proceeds attributable thereto, be used by the donee to advance similar charitable 
purposes elsewhere.61 By contrast, when the real property law doctrine of changed 
conditions leads to the termination of a servitude, such as in a residential 
subdivision, there is seldom an entitlement to damages.62  
 
III. THE PROCEEDS REGULATION AND POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES 
 
A. The Proceeds Regulation 
 
1. How it Operates 
 
The proceeds regulation mandates that, at the time of the gift, the donor 
must agree that the donation of the easement gives rise to a property right, 
immediately vested in the donee, with a fair market value that is at least equal to 
“the proportionate value that the [easement] at the time of the gift, bears to the value 
of the property as a whole at that time.”63 Both the Tax Court and the Fifth Circuit 
have determined that the “proportionate value” is a fraction equal to the value of 
 
60 See, e.g., Carpenter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-1, at *6 (gifts of deductible conservation 
easements constituted restricted charitable gifts, which are “‘contributions conditioned on the use 
of a gift in accordance with the donor's precise directions and limitations.’ Schmidt, ‘Modern Tomb 
Raiders: Nonprofit Organizations' Impermissible Use of Restricted Funds’, 31 Colo. Law. 57, 58 
(2002)”); Herzog Foundation v. University of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997) (discussing 
the general rule that charitable gifts are enforceable by state attorneys general and the courts). See 
also Oakbrook Land Holdings v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-54, *15-*17 (explaining the need 
to limit the ability of donors and donees of deductible conservation easements to declare “changed 
circumstances” all by themselves and noting that, “[g]etting a judge involved means there will be a 
third party to monitor whether conditions really have changed”).  
61 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Trusts, § 67. The cy pres doctrine applies to gifts to charitable 
corporations as well as to charitable trusts. See, e.g., In re Scott’s Will, 208 N.Y.S.2d 984, 988 (N.Y. 
1960). 
62 See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 7.11 cmt. c (2000). See also Oakbrook, T.C. 
Memo. 2020-54, *15-*16  (the common-law rule of only implicit compensation for termination of 
an easement “wouldn’t work with conservation easements” and “could embolden landowners 
(imagine well-financed developers) to use the threat of protracted changed-conditions litigation to 
coerce donees (imagine thinly staffed nonprofit organizations) into modifying or terminating their 
easements.”).  
63 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii). 
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the conservation easement at the time of the gift, divided by the value of the 
property as a whole at that time.64  
The proceeds regulation further provides that “that proportionate value” 
(the fraction) “shall remain constant” and, if an easement is extinguished as 
provided in the judicial proceeding regulation, the donee, “on a subsequent sale, 
exchange, or involuntary conversion of the subject property, must be entitled to a 
portion of the proceeds at least equal to that proportionate value,” with one 
exception not relevant here.65 By providing that the donee must be entitled, 
following extinguishment, to “at least” that proportionate value of the proceeds, 
with that proportionate value established at the time of the gift, the proceeds 
regulation establishes a floor—the donee’s share can never be less than that 
minimum proportionate value (or fraction) of the proceeds, although it could be 
more if the parties were to so agree.66  
To illustrate the operation of the proceeds regulation, assume the following. 
A conservation easement that complied with the requirements of § 170(h) and the 
Treasury Regulations was contributed as a charitable gift to a qualified 
organization. The fair market value of the subject property before the gift was 
$1,000,000 and the fair market value of the subject property after the gift was 
$700,000. Under the “before and after” valuation method described in the 
regulations, the fair market value of the easement at the time of the gift was 
$300,000.67   
To comply with the proceeds regulation, the donor agreed in the easement 
deed that, at the time of the gift, the donation gave rise to a property right, 
immediately vested in the donee, with a fair market value that is equal to a fraction, 
the numerator of which is the value of the conservation easement at the time of the 
gift (in this example, $300,000), and the denominator of which is the value of the 
property as a whole at that time (in this example, $1,000,000). The donor also 
 
64 Carroll v. Commissioner, 146 T.C. 196, 216 (2016); PBBM-Rose Hill, Ltd v. Commissioner, 900 
F.3d 193, 207 (5th Cir. 2018); Oakbrook Land Holdings v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-54, 
*8-*11. 
65 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii). An “involuntary conversion” is “[t]he loss or destruction of 
property through theft, casualty, or condemnation.” BRYAN A. GARNER, ED., BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, (11TH ED. 2019), conversion. Accordingly, “the proceeds” in the case of an involuntary 
conversion could be insurance proceeds or a condemnation award. For discussion of the exception, 
see infra note 127 and accompanying text.  
66 See, e.g., Railroad Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-22, at *14 (“[t]he 
[proceeds] regulation sets a minimum for the donee’s participation in extinguishment proceeds and 
then, using the phrase ‘at least’, makes it explicit that a deed may be more generous to the donee 
and still comply”).  
67 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h(3)(i). For a discussion of the rules governing the valuation of 
conservation easements for purposes of the § 170(h) deduction, see Nancy A. McLaughlin, 
Conservation Easements and the Valuation Conundrum, 19 FLA. TAX. REV. 227, 231-246 (2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2704576.   
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3760530
 16 
agreed that this fraction, expressed as a percentage (in this example, 30%), shall 
remain constant. The easement deed further provided that the easement can be 
extinguished only in a judicial proceeding, upon a finding by the court that a 
subsequent unexpected change in the conditions surrounding the property has made 
impossible or impractical the continued use of the property for conservation 
purposes, and, in such event, the donee will be entitled to at least that percentage 
of the proceeds from a subsequent sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion of the 
subject property, and must use those proceeds in a manner consistent with the 
conservation purposes of the original contribution.  
Some years after the gift of the easement, and after the property had changed 
hands, the easement was extinguished in whole in a judicial proceeding upon a 
finding that continued use of the property for conservation purposes had become 
impossible or impractical and the property, unencumbered by the easement, was 
sold in an arm’s-length transaction for $5 million. In accordance with the terms of 
the easement, the donee received 30% of those post-extinguishment proceeds, or 
$1.5 million, and used the $1.5 million in a manner consistent with the conservation 
purposes of the original contribution. The property owner received the remaining 
$3.5 million of post-extinguishment proceeds.  
The donee’s receipt of $1.5 million of the post-extinguishment proceeds and 
use of those proceeds in a manner consistent with the conservation purposes of the 
original contribution carried out Congress’s directive in § 170(h)(5)(A) that “the 
conservation purpose [of the contribution be] protected in perpetuity.” Although 
the conservation purpose of the contribution could no longer be carried out through 
the easement, it nonetheless continued to be carried out through the donee’s use of 
its share of the post-extinguishment proceeds to advance similar conservation 
purposes elsewhere.68  
In addition, by mandating that the donee be entitled to at least the specified 
minimum percentage of post-extinguishment proceeds (30% of $5 million), as 
opposed to an amount equal to the dollar value of the easement at the time of its 
donation ($300,000), the proceeds regulation ensured that the donee received a 
percentage of the proceeds attributable to the appreciation in the value of the 
property as a whole following the donation (from $1 million to $5 million). If the 
proceeds regulation limited the donee’s share of post-extinguishment proceeds to 
the dollar value of the easement at the time of its donation, the donee would have 
watched its proportion of potential post-extinguishment proceeds shrink over the 
years as the property as a whole appreciated in value.69 Moreover, if some of that 
appreciation were attributable to the easement, the property owner would have had 
a perverse incentive to seek extinguishment. For example, if the encumbered 
property and the easement had appreciated in value proportionally, such that, at the 
 
68 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
69 See Railroad Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-22, at *14.  
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time of extinguishment, the value of the encumbered property was $3.5 million and 
the value of the easement was $1.5 million, and the donee was entitled to only 
$300,000 of the $5 million of post-extinguishment proceeds, the property owner 
would have had an incentive to seek extinguishment to benefit from the $1.2 million 
of appreciation attributable to the easement. 
The proceeds regulation also should apply in the case of partial 
extinguishments. For example, assume in the example above that, instead of a 
wholesale extinguishment, a small strip of the encumbered property that adjoined 
a road was condemned to widen the road for safety purposes.70 Assume also that 
the condemning authority paid just compensation of $150,000 for the taking of both 
the strip of the encumbered property and the portion of the conservation easement 
encumbering that strip. Under the easement deed, the donee would be entitled to 
30% of the condemnation award, or $45,000, and would be required to use the 
$45,000 in a manner consistent with the conservation purposes of the original 
contribution. The property owner would be entitled to the remaining $105,000.71 
 
2. No Subtraction of Improvements  
 
In PBBM-Rose Hill, Ltd. v. Commissioner, the Fifth Circuit sustained the 
IRS’s disallowance of a deduction claimed for the conveyance of a conservation 
easement because the easement deed did not comply with the proceeds regulation.72 
The deed provided that, following extinguishment of the easement, the donee was 
entitled to the correct percentage of the post-extinguishment proceeds. However, 
the deed also provided that, before calculating the donee’s percentage share, the 
post-extinguishment proceeds had to be reduced by an amount attributable to 
improvements constructed on the property pursuant to the property owner’s 
reserved rights.73 The Fifth Circuit held that the easement deed did not comply with 
the proceeds regulation because of the subtraction provision.74  
The Fifth Circuit explained that, under the plain language of the proceeds 
regulation, following extinguishment, the donee of a conservation easement “must” 
be entitled to at least the mandated minimum percentage of “the proceeds” from a 
subsequent sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion of the property, and “the 
 
70 A condemnation is a “subsequent unexpected change in the conditions surrounding the property.” 
Treas. Reg. § 1.170(g)(6)(i). 
71 See infra Part IV.B for a further discussion of apportionment of a condemnation award upon the 
taking of land subject to a conservation easement. 
72 PBBM-Rose Hill, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 900 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2018). The PBBM easement was 
conveyed to the North American Land Trust and encumbered a 27-hole golf course in a gated and 
guarded residential community in South Carolina. Id. at 198, 202. The taxpayer overvalued the 
PBBM easement by more than $15 million. See infra note 99. 
73 PBBM-Rose Hill, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 900 F.3d 193, 199 (5th Cir. 2018). 
74 Id. at 207-209. 
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proceeds” refers to “the total amount brought in from” such sale, exchange, or 
involuntary conversion.75 The regulation, said the court, does not indicate that any 
amount may be subtracted from “the proceeds” before calculating the donee’s 
percentage share, including amounts attributable to improvements.76 The court also 
pointed out that the regulation preceding the extinguishment regulation suggests 
that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue recognized that a donor may reserve 
rights to construct improvements on the property post-donation, but chose not to 
carve out an exception for the value attributable to those improvements in the 
proceeds regulation.77 
Following the Fifth Circuit’s decision in PBBM, the Tax Court denied 
deductions on similar grounds in a number of cases, many of which involved 
syndicated conservation easement donation transactions.78 In some of the cases, the 
easements called for the subtraction from post-extinguishment proceeds of not only 
the value attributable to improvements that a property owner constructed on the 
property post-donation, but also post-donation appreciation in the value of 
improvements that had existed on the property at the time of the donation.79  
Taxpayers have argued that the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the proceeds 
regulation as it relates to improvements is incorrect or, alternatively, that the 
regulation should be deemed procedurally or substantively invalid.80 They have 
argued that it is unfair and irrational for the donee of a conservation easement to be 
entitled to post-extinguishment proceeds attributable to the value of improvements 
that were made and paid for by the donor and for which the donor did not receive a 
 
75 Id. at  207-208 (emphasis in original). 
76 Id. at 208. The PBBM easement also provided for the “actual bona fide expenses” of a sale to be 
subtracted from the post-extinguishment proceeds before calculating the donee’s share. Id. at 199. 
While the Fifth Circuit did not directly address this subtraction, it did state that the plain language 
of the proceeds regulation does not indicate that “any” amount can be subtracted from post-
extinguishment proceeds before calculating the donee’s percentage share. Id. at 208. Accordingly, 
an easement deed should be drafted to entitle the donee to receive at least its mandated minimum 
percentage of the total amount of the proceeds, the property owner would be entitled to the 
remaining proceeds, and then each party could pay its share of the expenses out of the proceeds it 
received.  
77 Id. The regulation preceding the extinguishment regulation provides that, when an easement donor 
reserves rights, “the exercise of which may impair the conservation interests associated with the 
property,” the donor must make available to the donee, prior to the time the donation is made, 
documentation sufficient to establish the condition of the subject property at the time of the gift. 
This documentation, generally referred to as “baseline documentation,” “is designed to protect the 
conservation interests associated with the property, which although protected in perpetuity by the 
easement, could be adversely affected by the exercise of the reserved rights.” Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-
14(g)(5)(i). 
78 See supra note 5. 
79 See id. 
80 See supra note 6. 
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charitable deduction.81  
Building on the example above, in which the donee is entitled to 30% of 
any post-extinguishment proceeds, the taxpayers would argue that, if the donor had 
constructed a residence on the encumbered property post-donation, and the 
property was sold following extinguishment of the easement for $6 million rather 
than $5 million (with the additional $1 million attributable to the increase in the 
property’s value as a result of the residence), it would be irrational and unfair for 
the donee to receive 30% of the proceeds attributable to that $1 million increase 
because the donor constructed and paid for the residence and the residence was not 
the subject of a deductible charitable donation. They also would argue that it would 
be even more irrational to require a subsequent property owner to forfeit to the 
donee a portion of the proceeds attributable to improvements constructed and paid 
for by the subsequent owner given that the subsequent owner did not donate the 
easement or receive a charitable contribution deduction.  
Those arguments are not persuasive when considered in light of the 
unpredictable variables that can affect the amount of post-extinguishment proceeds 
to be divided between the parties, as well as the undesirability of creating an 
incentive on the part of property owners to seek to extinguish deductible perpetual 
easements. Those arguments also do not take into account the significant challenges 
that would be associated with determining the value attributable to improvements 
or appreciation in the value of improvements at the time of an extinguishment. 
 
a. Unpredictable Variables and Perverse Incentives 
 
Conservation easements can appreciate in value relative to the value of the 
property they encumber following their donation. In addition, many deductible 
conservation easements are drafted to limit the donee’s share of post-
extinguishment proceeds to the minimum percentage required by the proceeds 
regulation—the 30% in our example above. Although it is permissible for a 
deductible conservation easement to provide that the donee is entitled to more than 
the minimum percentage of post-extinguishment proceeds,82 because it is not 
required, many easements are drafted to provide that the donee is entitled to only 
the minimum percentage or to “at least” that percentage, in which case the payment 
of a higher percentage to the donee would be in the discretion of whoever happens 
to own the subject property at the time of extinguishment.83 
 
81 See supra note 7. 
82 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
83 See, e.g., Railroad Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-22, at *14 (the right under 
an easement deed to receive “at least” a specified share means there is only a hope that there might 
be more).  
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If a conservation easement appreciates in value relative to the value of the 
property it encumbers following its donation, and the donee’s percentage of post-
extinguishment proceeds is limited to the minimum percentage, then following 
extinguishment, the property owner would receive the benefit of all of the relative 
appreciation in the value of the easement. The ability to benefit from the relative 
appreciation in the value of an easement may create a perverse incentive on the part 
of property owners to seek extinguishments. Not subtracting the value of 
improvements from post-extinguishment proceeds before calculating the donee’s 
percentage share may serve to temper that perverse incentive.  
Another example is in order. Assume the same easement donation as 
described above (in which the easement represented 30% of the value of the 
property as a whole at the time of its donation), but years have passed since the 
donation, the surrounding area has become urbanized, development pressures have 
increased, and the fair market value of the property subject to the easement is now 
$2 million, the fair market value of the property if the easement were extinguished 
would be $5 million, and thus, the value of the easement is now $3 million, meaning 
the easement now represents 60% of the value of the property as a whole. Assume 
also that no improvements were constructed on the property post-donation, and 
there has been no appreciation in the value of the improvements that existed on the 
property at the time of the easement’s donation. A speculator purchases the 
property, subject to the easement, in an arm’s length transaction for $2 million and 
soon thereafter is successful in having the easement extinguished in a judicial 
proceeding. The speculator then sells the newly unencumbered property for $5 
million.  
If the donee and the speculator were to receive post-extinguishment 
proceeds equal to the value of easement at the time of the extinguishment and the 
value of the property subject to the easement at that time, respectively, the donee 
would receive $3 million and the speculator would receive $2 million. Under the 
easement deed, however, the donee would be entitled to only 30% of the $5 million 
proceeds, or $1.5 million, and the speculator would be entitled to the remaining 
$3.5 million, even though the speculator purchased the property subject to the 
easement for only $2 million. The speculator would benefit from the difference 
between the percentage that the easement represented of the value of the property 
as a whole at the time of its extinguishment (60%) and the percentage that the 
easement represented of the value of the property as a whole at the time of its 
donation (30%). In other words, the speculator would be entitled to the $1.5 million 
of proceeds attributable to the relative appreciation in the value of the easement 
(30% of $5 million). 
The speculator’s ability to benefit from the relative appreciation in the value 
of the easement could persist, at least in part, even if the donee is entitled to a 
percentage of the post-extinguishment proceeds attributable to the value of 
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improvements. To illustrate, assume the same facts as in the preceding example, 
except that a residence was constructed on the property post-donation, the 
speculator purchased the property with the residence for $3 million, and the 
property is sold following extinguishment of the easement for $6 million (this 
assumes the residence increased the value of the property by $1 million). Under the 
easement deed, the donee would be entitled to 30% of the $6 million of post-
extinguishment proceeds, or $1.8 million, and the speculator would be entitled to 
the remaining $4.2 million of proceeds. Even though the value attributable to the 
residence was not subtracted from the post-extinguishment proceeds before 
calculating the donee’s share, the speculator would receive $1.2 million more than 
her $3 million investment in the property and thus would still benefit financially 
from the extinguishment. 
As the Table below illustrates, on the facts of the example, the speculator 
would receive more proceeds following extinguishment than she invested in the 
property (that is, the speculator would profit from the extinguishment) provided 
that the value attributable to the residence was less than $5 million. Only if the 
value of the residence exceeded $5 million would the speculator receive less than 
her investment upon extinguishment. In addition, the last column in the Table 
illustrates that, if the value attributable to improvements were subtracted from the 
post-extinguishment proceeds before calculating the donee’s share, the donee 
would never receive more than $1.5 million (30% of $5 million84), and the property 
owner would always benefit from the full $1.5 million of post-donation relative 





84 $5 million is the value of the land unencumbered by the easement at the time of the extinguishment 
if the increase in the land’s value due to the residence is not taken into account. 
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Donation Values (No Residence)                                                  M = Million 
Before-easement value of the land:  $ 1,000,000                            D = Donee 
After-easement value of the land:    $    700,000                             S = Speculator 
Easement value:                               $    300,000 (30%) 
 
Extinguishment Values (No Residence) 
Value of land unencumbered by easement: $ 5,000,000 
Value of land encumbered by easement:     $ 2,000,000 



























D: $1.5M (30% x $5M) 
S: $3.5M ($1.5M profit) 
D: $1.5M 









D: $1.8M (30% x $6M) 
S: $4.2M ($1.2M profit) 
D: $1.5M 








D: $2.1M (30% x $7M) 
S: $4.9M ($ .9M profit) 
D: $1.5M 









D: $2.4M (30% x $8M) 
S: $5.6M ($ .6M profit) 
D: $1.5M 









D: $2.7M (30% x $9M) 
S: $6.3M ($ .3M profit) 
D: $1.5M 









D: $3M (30% x $10M) 
S: $7M (break even) 
D: $1.5M 









D: $3.3M (30% x $11M) 
S: $7.7M ($ .3M loss) 
D: $1.5M 






85 The values in this column represent the increase in the value of the land due to the residence at 
the time of the easement’s extinguishment. It is assumed, for example, that if the residence increased 
the value of the land encumbered by the easement by $1M at the time of the extinguishment, the 
residence similarly increased the value of the land unencumbered by the easement by $1M at that 
time.  
86 The values in this column represent the value at extinguishment of the land unencumbered by the 
easement ($5M) plus the increase in that value attributable to the residence. 
87 This is the amount the investor paid for the land encumbered by the easement in an arm’s length 
transaction. 
88 This, and the remaining values in this column, represent the amount paid by the investor for the 
land encumbered by the easement ($2M), as increased by the value attributable to the residence. 
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The foregoing examples illustrate that, depending on the facts, not 
subtracting the value attributable to improvements from post-extinguishment 
proceeds before calculating the donee’s percentage share may not, in fact, be unfair 
to donors or subsequent property owners—they may still receive more on 
extinguishment than their investment in the property. Not subtracting the value of 
improvements also enables the donee to recoup some or all of the proceeds 
attributable to the relative appreciation in the value of the easement and, thus, 
provides the donee with more proceeds to be used to advance similar conservation 
purposes elsewhere.89 Moreover, not subtracting the value of improvements and 
thereby reducing the profit to be made from an extinguishment can tamp down the 
perverse incentive on the part of property owners to seek extinguishment of 
easements.  
Of course, relative appreciation in the value of a conservation easement is 
only one of the variables that may impact the amount of post-extinguishment 
proceeds to which the donee and property owner may be entitled at the time of 
extinguishment. A conservation easement may also depreciate in value relative to 
the value of the property as a whole following its donation. The value attributable 
to improvements will also vary from property to property and with regard to the 
same property over the perpetual life of an easement. Over the perpetual life of an 
easement, improvements may be constructed and torn down, they may undergo 
physical, functional, and external obsolescence, and they may require costly 
demolition and removal. Moreover, it is impossible to predict, at the time of an 
easement’s donation, whether an “unexpected and extraordinary” change in 
conditions will cause the easement to be extinguished in whole or part, or when that 
might happen, or the status of the foregoing variables at that uncertain future time.90 
The goal of this subpart is not to argue that the proceeds regulation would 
never operate to provide the owner of easement-encumbered property with less than 
its financial investment in a property at the time of extinguishment. Rather, it is to 
illustrate that claims that the proceeds regulation is irrational and unfair do not take 
into account all of the unpredictable variables that may impact the amount of 
proceeds to which the parties will be entitled, and do not acknowledge that, 
depending on the facts, the regulation can financially benefit property owners. This 
subpart also illustrates that the proceeds regulation can protect the public interest 
when there has been relative appreciation in the value of an easement by both 
reducing the incentive of property owners to seek extinguishments and allowing 
donees to recoup some of the proceeds attributable to that relative appreciation to 
be used to advance similar conservation purposes elsewhere. 
 
89 If a conservation easement appreciates in value relative the value of the property it encumbers, 
the cost of pursuing similar conservation opportunities, whether through the purchase of similar 
property or a similar easement, could be expected to similarly increase. 
90 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
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b. Avoidance of Valuation Difficulties 
 
Allowing the value attributable to improvements to be subtracted from post-
extinguishment proceeds before calculating the donee’s percentage share would 
give rise to a number of difficult valuation issues. For example, should the 
definition of “improvements” be limited to permanent structures, such as 
residences, guest houses, and barns? Or should the term be more broadly defined 
to include, for example, temporary structures, ponds, trails, access roads, 
driveways, utility lines (including water, septic, and power lines), irrigation 
systems, fencing, grading, and landscaping?91 Should post-extinguishment 
proceeds be reduced by only the value attributable to improvements that a property 
owner constructed on the property post-donation, or also by post-donation 
appreciation in the value of improvements that existed on the property at the time 
of the donation, or both?92 Should improvements or appreciation in the value 
thereof be valued as of the date of the extinguishment or the date on which the 
unencumbered property is subsequently sold or exchanged?93 Should the value 
attributable to improvements be determined by an appraisal and, if so, should the 
appraisal be a “qualified appraisal” or meet other requirements?94 Who would 
police satisfaction of any such requirements? Who should choose the appraiser, 
define the scope of the assignment, and pay for the appraisal? What valuation 
methods should be employed?95 And what should be done if the property owner 
and donee did not agree on the values?96  
 
91 See THE DICTIONARY OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL (4TH ED., 2002, APPRAISAL INSTITUTE) 
(Improvements may consist of buildings or other relatively permanent structures (such as residences 
and agricultural structures), as well as other additions that make a property usable, such as access 
roads, driveways, utility lines, irrigation systems, fences, and ponds). 
92 Determining post-donation appreciation in the value of improvements that existed on the property 
at the time of the donation could be particularly difficult if those improvements were not valued 
separately in the qualified appraisal that was obtained at the time of the easement’s donation. A 
retrospective appraisal of the value that improvements added to a property years in the past could 
require an appraiser to attempt to determine values without readily available or reliable data. 
93 Some time may pass following an extinguishment before the underlying property or portions 
thereof are sold and post-extinguishment proceeds distributed. 
94 See supra notes 35-37, referencing the qualified appraisal and conservation-easement specific 
valuation rules. 
95 A number of valuation methods might be employed to determine the value of an improvement, 
such as the property owner’s cost in constructing the improvement, the estimated cost to replace the 
improvement, the estimated cost to reproduce the improvement, or the extent to which the 
improvement increases the value of the property. These different valuation methods may produce 
different value estimates. 
96 The fact that the proceeds regulation does not address any of these issues provides compelling 
support for the Fifth Circuit’s finding that the proceeds regulation was not intended to permit 
subtraction of the value attributable to improvements from post-extinguishment proceeds. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3760530
 25 
The difficulties associated with addressing the foregoing issues would be 
compounded by the fact that property owners and donees would have starkly 
opposing interests regarding the value attributable to improvements. In addition, 
donees, which serve as guardians of the public investment in deductible easements, 
would often be at a disadvantage in arguing their position. Many nonprofit and 
government donees have limited capacity and resources, and they also have a desire 
to maintain good relations with property owners and avoid negative publicity in the 
communities in which they work. Those factors could make it difficult for donees 
to successfully challenge property owners’ overestimates of the value of 
improvements. As a practical matter, subtracting the value of improvements from 
post-extinguishment proceeds before calculating the donee’s percentage share 
would likely enrich property owners at the public’s expense and leave donees with 
fewer proceeds with which to advance similar conservation purposes elsewhere.  
The proceeds regulation avoids all of the foregoing issues. Under the 
proceeds regulation, the donee must be entitled to at least a minimum percentage 
of any post-extinguishment proceeds, and that minimum percentage is generally 
determined based on the values set forth in the qualified appraisal the donor 
obtained at the time of the easement’s donation. That qualified appraisal must 
comply with numerous requirements and is subject to indirect policing by the IRS 
and the courts at the time of the easement’s donation as part of the tax return review 
and audit process.97 In addition, if there is a final settlement with the IRS or final 
determination made by a court with regard to the percentage value of the easement 
at the time of its donation, that percentage should control for purposes of the 
proceeds regulation. 
 
B. Easement Value at Extinguishment 
 
One possible alternative to the formula in the proceeds regulation would be 
to require that the donee of a deductible conservation easement be entitled to an 
amount of post-extinguishment proceeds equal to the dollar value of the easement 
at the time of its extinguishment.98 This alternative would appear to ensure that the 
donee would receive the benefit of any post-donation relative appreciation in the 
value of the easement, and that the property owner would receive only the dollar 
value of the property subject to the easement at the time of the extinguishment. 
There would, however, be significant drawbacks to this alternative.  
 
97 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 
98 This alternative could be structured to entitle the donee to a percentage (rather than a dollar 
amount) of post-extinguishment proceeds, with the percentage based on the value of the easement 
at the time of its extinguishment relative to the value of the property as a whole at that time, but 
such a rule would suffer from the same drawbacks discussed in this subpart.  
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Because of the persistent problem of overvaluation of conservation 
easements in the § 170(h) deduction context, which has been exacerbated by the 
rise in the number of abusive syndicated easement donation transactions,99 this 
alternative could lead to systematic underpayment of post-extinguishment proceeds 
to donees relative to the public investment in the easements. In addition, because 
easements might not be accurately valued at the time of their extinguishment, this 
alternative would not guarantee that a donee would receive the benefit of any post-
donation relative appreciation in the value of an easement, or that the property 
owner would receive only the dollar value of the property subject to the easement 
at the time of the extinguishment. As with valuing improvements at 
extinguishment, revaluing easements at extinguishment would give rise to a 
number of difficult valuation issues. 
 
1. Possibility of Systematic Underpayment of Donees  
 
If a conservation easement is overvalued at the time of its donation, and 
then accurately valued or undervalued at the time of its extinguishment, much of 
the public investment in the easement through the deduction program could be lost 
under this alternative. To illustrate, assume the following. A landowner donated a 
conservation easement and claimed a deduction of $8 million, based on an abusive 
 
99 On overvaluation in the nonsyndicated easement donation context, see, e.g., PBBM-Rose Hill, 
Ltd. v. Commissioner, 900 F.3d 193, 209-213 (5th Cir. 2018) (golf course conservation easement 
had a value of $100,000, not the $15.16 million the taxpayer had claimed); Johnson v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-79 (ranchland conservation easement had a value of $372,919, 
not the $610,000 the taxpayer had claimed); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements and 
the Valuation Conundrum, 19 FLA. TAX. REV. 227, 249, 266 (2016) (discussing the persistent 
problem of overvaluation of conservation easements). On overvaluation in the syndicated easement 
donation transaction context, see, e.g., Senate Finance Committee Bipartisan Investigative Report, 
supra note 10, at 105 (“The [syndicated easement donation] transactions discussed in this report 
involve land valuations that appear so inflated above their original purchase prices that they cannot 
reasonably be characterized as anything other than abusive tax shelters”). Professor Daniel Halperin, 
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, explains why conservation easements are “often 
hard to appraise and easy to overvalue”: 
The IRS regulations provide that, in the absence of comparable sales [of conservation 
easements], a donor must generally look to the difference between the value of the property 
before the restriction and the value of the property subject to the easement. This is 
extremely difficult to determine because it is heavily fact specific. For example, it would 
be necessary to determine what the zoning regulations are, whether they are likely to 
change, and what sort of development was commercially feasible prior to the restrictions, 
as well as other issues. That there is no standard form of easement exacerbates these 
difficulties, as does the IRS’s lack of the resources required to wade through long 
documents—drafted by hundreds of different attorneys—in order to determine exactly 
what restrictions are in place…. 
See Halperin, supra note 13, 40-41. 
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appraisal that indicated that the value of the property before the donation was $10 
million, the value of the property after the donation was $2 million, and, thus, 
accordingly to the appraisal, the easement represented 80% of the value of the 
property as a whole at the time of its donation. Because of the IRS’s limited 
resources, the claimed $8 million deduction was not challenged and the donor 
received tax savings from the deduction of $2.8 million.100 A number of years later, 
after the statute of limitations had run on the donor’s deduction, and without any 
change in the actual value of the property or the easement, the easement is 
extinguished in a judicial proceeding, the unencumbered property is sold in an 
arm’s-length transaction for just $3 million (its fair market value101), and a 
nonabusive appraisal indicates the easement has a value of only $750,000 and, thus, 
represents only 25% of the value of the property as a whole.  
If the donee were entitled to post-extinguishment proceeds equal to the 
dollar value of the easement at the time of its extinguishment, the donee would 
receive only $750,000, even though the donor had claimed that the easement had a 
value of $8 million at the time of its donation and the public invested $2.8 million 
in the easement through the deduction. This example illustrates that requiring that 
a donee be entitled to the dollar value of a deductible easement at the time of its 
extinguishment could lead to underpayment of post-extinguishment proceeds to 
donees relative to the public investment made in the easements. Given the persistent 
problem of overvaluation in the § 170(h) deduction context and the limited ability 
of the IRS to police valuation in our voluntary compliance tax system, this 
alternative could result in systematic underpayment of post-extinguishment 
proceeds to donees.102 
In contrast, under the proceeds regulation, the donee in the example would 
be entitled to at least 80% of the $3 million of post-extinguishment proceeds, or 
$2.4 million. By requiring that the donee must always receive “at least” the 
donation (or floor) percentage of post-extinguishment proceeds, the proceeds 
 
100 This assumes, for simplicity purposes, that $2.8 million is the amount of income tax the donor 
otherwise would have paid at an assumed flat rate of 35% absent the $8 million deduction. This 
calculation ignores possible limitations, deductions, and other complexities not relevant here. Actual 
tax savings in individual cases would depend on a variety of factors. 
101 In the charitable contribution context, “fair market value” is defined as “the price at which the 
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any 
compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. Treas. Reg. § 
1.170A-1(c)(2). 
102 See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 13, at 40, 44 (the IRS “obviously can audit only a small sample 
of all transactions”); Trends in the Internal Revenue Service’s Funding and Enforcement, Congress 
of the United States, Congressional Budget Office (July 2020), 
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-07/56422-CBO-IRS-enforcement.pdf (IRS enforcement 
activities declined over the 2010-2018 period as IRS resources were reduced). 
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regulation helps to protect the public’s investment in deductible easements that 
were overvalued at the time of their donation and resulted in inflated deductions. 
 
2. Valuation Difficulties 
 
If the donee of a deductible conservation easement were entitled to post-
extinguishment proceeds equal to the dollar value of the easement at the time of its 
extinguishment (or partial extinguishment, such as through condemnation of a strip 
of property adjacent to a road), a number of valuation difficulties would arise. First, 
the easement (or the part that is extinguished) would have to be valued as of the 
date of the extinguishment. That valuation would give rise to many of the same 
issues that would arise if improvements had to be valued as of the date of an 
extinguishment; questions would arise regarding how the value would be 
determined, the property owner and donee would have starkly opposing interests, 
and it would be similarly difficult for the donee to successfully challenge the 
property owner’s valuation of the easement.103  
Moreover, additional difficulties would arise. A sale, exchange, or 
involuntary conversion of the subject property may not occur for some years 
following extinguishment of an easement, and the value of the easement on the date 
of its extinguishment may not be determined until that later date, necessitating a 
retrospective appraisal. Retrospective appraisals performed many years after the 
effective valuation date can be particularly challenging because the appraiser may 
be forced to try to ascertain market conditions and trends without readily available 
or reliable data.  
Partial extinguishments could be dealt with in different ways. For example, 
the dollar value of the portion of the easement that is extinguished could be 
determined for purposes of providing the donee its share of post-extinguishment 
proceeds. Alternatively, the value of the entire easement relative to the value of the 
property as a whole at the time of the extinguishment could be determined and the 
donee could be entitled to that percentage of the post-extinguishment proceeds. 
Furthermore, portions of the subject property might be sold or exchanged at 
different times following extinguishment of an easement, and that would raise 
additional questions. The donee could be paid first from each allotment of post-
extinguishment proceeds until it received the full dollar value of the easement at its 
extinguishment ($750,000 from the example immediately above). Alternatively, 
the donee could be paid only a percentage of each allotment of post-extinguishment 
proceeds until fully paid, with the percentage equal to the value of the easement at 
its extinguishment relative to the value of the property as a whole at that time (25% 
from the example immediately above).  
 
103 See supra Part III.A.2(b). 
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The proceeds regulation avoids the foregoing issues. There is no need under 
the proceeds regulation to value an easement or part thereof as of the date of the 
extinguishment, or to resolve the other issues outlined above. Rather, 
implementation is simple—the donee is entitled to the minimum percentage of each 
allotment of post-extinguishment proceeds.  
 
C. The “Greater Of” Formula 
 
Another possible alternative to the proceeds regulation formula would be to 
require that the donee of a deductible conservation easement, following 
extinguishment, be entitled to the greater of (1) the minimum percentage of any 
post-extinguishment proceeds or (2) the dollar value of the easement at the time of 
its extinguishment. This greater-of formula would comply with the proceeds 
regulation because it would ensure that the donee would always receive “at least” 
the minimum percentage of any post-extinguishment proceeds.104  
As with the proceeds regulation, this alternative would help to protect the 
public investment in easements that were overvalued at the time of their donation 
by providing that the donee would always be entitled to at least the minimum 
percentage of any post-extinguishment proceeds.105 This alternative would also 
appear to ensure that the donee would receive the benefit of any post-donation 
relative appreciation in the value of the easement.106 However, there are significant 
drawbacks to this alternative. 
 
104 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
105 To illustrate, consider again the example in which the landowner donated a conservation 
easement, claimed a deduction of $8 million based on an abusive appraisal that indicated that the 
easement represented 80% of the value of the property as a whole at the time of its donation, and 
received tax savings from the deduction of $2.8 million. See supra Part III.B.1. A number of years 
later, and without any change in the actual value of the property or the easement, the easement is 
extinguished, the unencumbered property is sold for $3 million, and a nonabusive appraisal indicates 
the easement has a value of only $750,000 and, thus, represents only 25% of the value of the property 
as a whole. Id. Under the greater of alternative, the donee would be entitled to $2.4 million, which 
is the greater of (1) the minimum percentage (80%) of the $3 million of post-extinguishment 
proceeds, or $2.4 million, or (2) the dollar value of the easement at the time of its extinguishment 
($750,000).  
106 To illustrate, consider again the example in which the landowner donated a conservation 
easement that represented 30% of the value of the property as a whole at the time of its donation, 
and years later when the easement is extinguished it has a value of $3 million and represents 60% 
of the value of the property as a whole. See supra Part III.A.2(a). The property is sold following 
extinguishment for $5 million. Id. Under this alternative, the donee would be entitled to $3 million, 
which is the greater of (1) the minimum percentage (30%) of the $5 million of post-extinguishment 
proceeds, or $1.5 million, or (2) the $3 million dollar value of the easement at the time of its 
extinguishment. This example assumes that the easement is correctly valued at the time of its 
extinguishment. 
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Donees would not necessarily receive the benefit of any post-donation 
relative appreciation in the value of easements under this alternative because the 
easements might not be accurately valued as of the date of their extinguishment. 
All of the difficulties associated with valuing easements as of the date of their 
extinguishment and the apportionment of proceeds would be present.107 In addition, 
if the greater of formula permitted the value attributable to improvements to be 
subtracted from post-extinguishment proceeds before calculating the donee’s 
minimum percentage share, all of the difficulties associated with valuing 
improvements as of the date of an extinguishment would also be present.108 
Moreover, the likelihood that the various valuation issues would be resolved in a 
manner that enriches property owners at the public’s expense would be high. The 
proceeds regulation, with its simple and easy-to-implement formula, avoids all of 
those issues. 
 
D. Carve-Outs and Flexibility 
 
A prospective conservation easement donor may prevent the donee from 
receiving post-extinguishment proceeds attributable to improvements by excluding 
or “carving out” from the easement the portions of the property on which 
improvements are or in the future may be located (the improvement areas).109 There 
are potential drawbacks to such carve-outs. From a conservation perspective, the 
donee would not be able to limit intensive uses in the excluded areas, and in some 
cases those intensive uses could negatively impact the conservation interests on the 
property encumbered by the easement. For example, a busy gas station on an 
excluded area could have significant negative effects on the conservation interests 
on the adjacent property. In addition, from a deduction perspective, excluding the 
improvement areas from an easement could reduce the donor’s deduction because 
less acreage would be encumbered by the easement and the Treasury Regulations 
require that an easement donor’s deduction be reduced to the extent that the 
donation increases the value of other property owned by the donor or a related 
person.110 The donation of a conservation easement might increase the value of the 
excluded improvement areas because prospective purchasers are often willing to 
 
107 See supra Part III.B.2. 
108 See supra Part III.A.2(b). 
109 A donee must be entitled to a share of the proceeds from a subsequent sale, exchange, or 
involuntary conversion of the property that is subject to the easement. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-
14(g)(6)(i). By excluding improvement areas from an easement, the donor ensures that the property 
that is subject to the easement will not include improvements.  
110 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i). “Related person” is defined to include various familial, 
entity, and trust relationships. See I.R.C. §§ 267(b), 707(b). For a discussion of these rules, see 
McLaughlin, supra note 67, at 245-246. 
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pay more for property that is adjacent to or otherwise benefits from permanently 
protected undeveloped land. 
The drawbacks to carve-outs could be addressed, at least in part, by having 
the donor convey two easements: one nondeductible easement that restricts uses in 
the excluded areas and a second deductible conservation easement encumbering the 
remaining property. Alternatively, restrictions in the conservation easement 
limiting access to the excluded areas may be sufficient to limit uses in those areas.  
Some easement donors may consider the advantage associated with carve-
outs—preventing the donee from receiving post-extinguishment proceeds 
attributable to improvements—to be worth the added cost and complexity. Others 
may be comfortable proceeding with the donation of an easement that encumbers 
areas in which improvements are or may be located given the improbability of an 
extinguishment, particularly during the donor’s limited ownership period, and the 
ability of the donor or subsequent property owner to benefit from any post-donation 
relative appreciation in the value of the easement in the event of an extinguishment. 
A donee working with a donor who wishes to exclude improvement areas 
from a conservation easement could insist on the two-easement option to protect 
the conservation interests on the property that will be encumbered by the easement. 
The donee also could insist that the easement be drafted to include the “greater of” 
formula discussed in Part III.C. to ensure that the donee would receive the full 
benefit of any post-donation relative appreciation in the value of easement, given 
that the donee would not be entitled to any proceeds attributable to improvements. 
The donee could further negotiate to include provisions in the easement addressing 
the various valuation issues that would arise.111 The proceeds regulation, with its 
“at least” formulation, permits this flexibility and encourages donees to consider 
the consequences of carve-outs and how best to protect the public interest and 
investment in easements.  
 
IV. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
A. Congress’s Power to Condition Deductions 
 
It is well-settled that Congress has the power to condition eligibility for a 
federal deduction upon satisfaction of requirements Congress sees fit to impose—
including, in the case of a conservation easement donation, that the conservation 
 
111 For example, the easement could authorize the donee to obtain the appraisal of the easement at 
the time of extinguishment, mandate that each party pay half of the cost of the appraisal from that 
party’s share of proceeds, and allow the donee to forego obtaining the appraisal if the donee deems 
that the anticipated benefit would not justify the cost (that is, if property values in the area indicate 
that there has not been any relative appreciation in the value of the easement). 
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purpose of the contribution must be protected in perpetuity.112 Congress also has 
the power to delegate to the Treasury the task of promulgating regulations 
interpreting federal tax code requirements.113 A prospective conservation easement 
donor who seeks to benefit from the § 170(h) deduction must meet the terms on 
which the offer was held out.114 That is, the donor must draft the easement to 
comply with the requirements of § 170(h) and, assuming they are procedurally and 
substantively valid, the Treasury Regulations interpreting those requirements.  
Whether a Treasury Regulation is valid is a separate issue from whether 
Congress has the power to condition eligibility for a federal deduction. Congress 
unquestionably has that power, even if qualifying for the deduction requires a 
taxpayer to structure a charitable gift in a particular way.115 For example, in 
Gillespie v. Commissioner, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of an 
estate tax charitable deduction claimed with regard to the donation to a charity of a 
remainder interest in a split-interest trust.116 The deduction was denied because the 
trust did not meet the requirements of IRC § 2055(e)(2).117 Section 2055(e)(2) 
authorizes a deduction for the donation to a charity of a remainder interest in a split-
interest trust only if the donation is made in the form of a charitable remainder 
annuity trust, a charitable remainder unitrust, or a pooled income fund, each of 
 
112 I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(A). See, e.g., Feinberg v. Commissioner, 916 F.3d 1330, 1333 (10th Cir. 2019) 
(“deductions ‘are matters of legislative grace specifically authorized by statute, and Congress has 
unquestioned power to condition, limit, or deny deductions’”); Wisely v. United States, 893 F.2d 
660, 666 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer seeking the 
benefit of a deduction must show that every condition which Congress has seen fit to impose has 
been fully satisfied”); J.E. Riley Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1940) 
(“Congress may condition deductions from gross income in any manner it sees fit”); Barbour Coal 
Co. v. Commissioner, 74 F.2d 163 (10th Cir. 1934) (“Congress has power to grant, restrict, or deny 
deductions”); Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371 (1934) (“Unquestionably 
Congress has power to condition, limit, or deny deductions from gross income in order to arrive at 
the net that it chooses to tax”). 
113 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Commissioner, 775 F.3d 1243, 1247 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Congress ... tasked 
the Commissioner with promulgating rules to ensure that a conservation purpose [will] be protected 
in perpetuity…. Acting pursuant to this authority, the Commissioner promulgated [Treasury 
Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(1)-(6)]” (citations omitted)). 
114 See, e.g., Wisely, 893 F.2d at 666 (“The taxpayer may not haggle with Congress; he either fits 
squarely within the statute in every particular or the deduction is unavailable”); J.E. Riley Inv. Co., 
110 F.2d at 655 (“The taking of the deduction was a privilege granted the taxpayer; and in order to 
avail himself of it he must meet the terms on which the offer was held out”); Barbour Coal Co., 74 
F.2d at 163 (“the right to an asserted deduction must come within an applicable provision of the 
statute, else it does not exist”). 
115 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
116 A split-interest trust is a trust that has both charitable and noncharitable beneficiaries. See, e.g., 
Wendy C. Gerzog, The Times They Are Not A-Changin’: Reforming the Charitable Split-Interest 
Rules (Again), 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 849, 862-863 (2010), 
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol85/iss3/2/.  
117 Gillespie v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 374 (1980).  
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which must meet specific requirements set forth in the IRC. As with § 170(h), 
Congress imposed the conditions in § 2055(e)(2) to protect against potential 
abuse.118  
In Gillespie, the estate that claimed the deduction argued that § 2055(e)(2) 
abrogated a decedent’s right under state law to provide for the needs of an income 
beneficiary and then pass any property remaining upon the beneficiary’s death to a 
charity.119 The Tax Court rejected that argument, explaining that § 2055(e)(2) did 
not have that effect.120 The court acknowledged that the creation and validity of 
testamentary trusts is governed by State law, not the IRC.121 However, the court 
explained that whether a particular transfer qualifies for a federal deduction is a 
matter of federal concern, and § 2055(e)(2) merely prescribes the requirements that 
must be met if a decedent wishes to obtain the benefit of a federal deduction for the 
donation of a remainder interest to charity.122 In other words, the decedent was free 
to structure the trust in any manner permissible under state law, but for his estate to 
be eligible for a federal deduction, the trust had to meet the requirements Congress 
saw fit to impose in § 2055(e)(2).  
The same is true for a conservation easement donation. The donor is free to 
draft the conservation easement in any manner permissible under applicable state 
law. However, to be eligible for a federal charitable deduction, the easement must 
meet the conditions Congress saw fit to impose in § 170(h), as interpreted by the 
Treasury in regulations. One of those conditions requires the donor to agree in the 
easement deed that the donee will be entitled to at least a minimum percentage of 
the total amount of any post-extinguishment proceeds. 
Mandating that the donee be entitled to at least a minimum percentage of 
any post-extinguishment proceeds, including any proceeds attributable to 
improvements, does not infringe upon the donor’s property rights under state law. 
To be eligible for the § 170(h) deduction, part of the charitable gift that must be 
made is the transfer to the donee of a right to a minimum percentage of the total 
amount of any post-extinguishment proceeds. Moreover, a conservation easement 
 
118 See id. at 377, 379 (“Congress found that charitable deductions were being allowed for transfers 
which resulted in little or no benefit to charity”). Remainder interests in trusts, like conservation 
easements, are partial interests in property and their donation similarly raises the possibility of 
abuse. 
119 Id. at 378. 
120 Id.  
121 Id. at 378-379.  
122 Id. at 379. See also, e.g., Carpenter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-1, at *5 (“State law 
determines the nature of the property rights, and Federal law determines the appropriate tax 
treatment of those rights”); Patel v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. 395, 404 (2012) (“State law determines only 
which sticks are in a person’s bundle. . . . Once property rights are determined under State law, as 
announced by the highest court of the State, the tax consequences are decided under Federal law” 
(citations omitted)). 
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donation is a voluntary act. A prospective easement donor who does not wish to 
comply with the proceeds regulation need not make the donation or need not claim 
a federal deduction for the donation. Alternatively, a prospective donor may 
negotiate with the donee to exclude from the easement’s coverage the areas in 
which improvements are or may be constructed, in which case the donee may insist 
on drafting the easement to entitle it to benefit from any post-donation relative 
appreciation in the value of the easement.123  
The proceeds regulation also does not infringe upon a subsequent owner’s 
property rights under state law. The purchase of property subject to a conservation 
easement is also a voluntary act, and a prospective purchaser of such property will 
have at least constructive notice of the terms of the easement. A prospective 
purchaser concerned about the division of post-extinguishment proceeds as 
provided in the easement deed need not purchase the property. Alternatively, the 
prospective purchaser could offer to pay a slightly reduced purchase price to 
address any perceived risk associated with that provision.  
 
B. Condemnation Awards 
  
While private property may not be taken for public use without the payment 
of just compensation,124 owners of interests in property are generally free to enter 
into enforceable agreements regarding the apportionment of condemnation 
awards.125 Thus, upon the condemnation of property subject to a conservation 
 
123 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
124 See Nancy A. McLaughlin, Condemning Conservation Easements: Protecting the Public Interest 
and Investment in Conservation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1897, 1904 (2008) (“The Taking Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides, in part, that private property shall not be 
taken for public use without just compensation, and the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Fifth 
Amendment applicable to the states and their political subdivisions.”), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1136963 [hereinafter, Condemning 
Conservation Easements]. 
125 See, e.g., United States v. 1.377 Acres of Land, 352 F.3d 1259, 1269 (9th Cir. 2003) (interpreting 
a lease to determine whether lessee was entitled to share in condemnation award and explaining that 
“parties are free to contract around the eminent domain rules”); City of Roeland Park v. Jasan Trust, 
132 P.3d 943, 948 (Kan. 2006) (“‘[T]he right of the lessee to compensation, as any other right, may 
be waived or contracted away by the terms of the lease’”); State by Humphrey v. Kouri, 415 N.W.2d 
412, 414 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (owner of billboards on condemned land not entitled to eminent 
domain proceeding to determine their value; lease with landowner treated billboards as personal 
property, which was not compensable, and “[p]arties may contract away their right to compensation 
in an eminent domain proceeding”); State Highway Dep't of Ga. v. Ivey, 120 S.E.2d 618, 620 (Ga. 
1961) (property owner’s agreement with highway department precluded a claim for damages to his 
other property by reason of construction work on the land that had been conveyed to the Highway 
Department); Honey Properties, Inc. v. City of Gastonia, 114 S.E.2d 344 (N.C. 1960) (contract 
between restaurant owner and city precluded compensation to restaurant owner for sewer lines when 
territory containing lines was annexed to the city). 
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easement, the terms of the easement will generally control apportionment of the 
condemnation award. The donee’s entitlement under the easement to at least the 
mandated minimum percentage of the total condemnation award, including the 
portion of the award attributable to improvements, would not constitute an 
unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation because the 
donor voluntarily entered into the apportionment agreement by donating a § 170(h)-
compliant conservation easement. In addition, any subsequent property owner 
would also have voluntarily entered into the apportionment agreement by 
purchasing the property subject to, and with at least constructive notice of, the 
easement. 
Some states have statutes that specifically address the apportionment of a 
condemnation award upon the taking of property subject to a conservation 
easement. In a few states, those statutes provide for payment of the full 
condemnation award to the property owner, meaning the donee would receive 
nothing.126 The proceeds regulation addresses this possibility by providing that the 
donee need not be entitled to a percentage of the post-extinguishment proceeds 
from an involuntary conversion “if state law provides that the donor is entitled to 
the full proceeds from the conversion without regard to the terms of the prior 
[easement].”127 An “involuntary conversion” includes the loss of property through 
condemnation.128 
In some states, a statute may provide that, upon the taking of property 
subject to a conservation easement, the donee shall receive a specified share of the 
condemnation award and that share might be smaller than the share the donee is 
required to receive under the proceeds regulation. For example, Virginia’s version 
of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act provides that, in an eminent domain 
proceeding, “the holder of the conservation easement shall be compensated for the 
value of the easement.”129 It is possible that the value of an easement at the time of 
its condemnation may be a smaller dollar amount than the minimum percentage of 
the total condemnation award. However, a donor might be able to nonetheless 
comply with the proceeds regulation in such a state by agreeing in the easement 
deed to transfer to the holder whatever portion of the donor’s share of a 
condemnation award is necessary to ensure that the holder receives the required 
minimum percentage of the total condemnation award.  
Even if a state eminent domain statute were deemed to preclude compliance 
with the proceeds regulation, that should not render the proceeds regulation 
unenforceable or unconstitutional. Rather, it should mean that a conservation 
 
126 For a discussion of those statutes, see Condemning Conservation Easements, supra note 124, at 
1961-1964. 
127 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii).  
128 See supra note 65. 
129 Va. Code Ann. § 10.1-1010(F). 
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easement governed by the statute would not be eligible for the federal deduction. 
Wachter v. Commissioner is illustrative.130 In Wachter, the Tax Court held that a 
North Dakota statute, which limits the duration of any easement created in the state 
after July 1, 1977, to a maximum of 99 years, prevents conservation easements in 
the state from being granted in perpetuity.131 Accordingly, donors of conservation 
easements in North Dakota cannot qualify for the § 170(h) deduction.132  
In Wachter, the Tax Court reiterated the fundamental principle that, while 
state law determines the nature of property rights, it is federal law that determines 
the federal tax treatment of those rights.133 Wachter also confirmed that a state 
statute can render all conservation easement donations in the state ineligible for the 
federal deduction. State legislatures are, of course, free to change their laws to allow 
for the creation of conservation easements that satisfy § 170(h) requirements and, 
thus, enable their citizens to benefit from the federal deduction. 
 
C. Conservation Easements Encumber Improvements 
 
Taxpayers have argued that the proceeds regulation should not be 
interpreted to require that the donee receive a percentage of post-extinguishment 
proceeds attributable to improvements because conservation easements apply only 
to the land they encumber and not to any improvements thereon.134 As a result, 
taxpayers have argued, the reference in the proceeds regulation to the proceeds from 
a sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion of “the subject property” refers to the 
proceeds from the sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion of the underlying land 
only, and not the improvements thereon.135  
The Tax Court rejected that argument in Belair Woods, LLC v. 
Commissioner on statutory and regulatory as well as commonsense grounds. The 
court explained that the use restrictions in a conservation easement deed apply, not 
only to the subject land, but also to any existing and future improvements on that 
 
130 Wachter v. Commissioner, 142 T.C. 140 (2014). 
131 Id. See N.D. Cent. Code § 47-05-02.1(2) (“Real property easements, servitudes, or any 
nonappurtenant restrictions on the use of real property, which become binding after July 1, 1977, 
shall be subject to the requirements of this section. These requirements are deemed a part of any 
agreement for such interests in real property whether or not printed in a document of agreement…. 
The duration of the easement, servitude, or nonappurtenant restriction on the use of real property 
must be specifically set out, and in no case may the duration of any interest in real property regulated 
by this section exceed ninety-nine years.”). 
132 The Tax Court noted that “[b]oth parties allege that the State law at issue here is unique because 
this is the only State that has a law that provides for a maximum duration that may not be overcome 
by agreement.” Wachter, 142 T.C. at 147. 
133 Id., citing United States v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 722, 105 S.Ct. 2919, 86 
L.Ed.2d 565 (1985). 
134 See Belair Woods, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-112. 
135 See id., at *14. 
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land.136 As examples, the court noted that the easement deed in Belair imposed a 
variety of restrictions on the improvements permitted under the deed, such as 
specifying the location of residential driveways and utility lines, including water, 
septic, and power lines.137  
The Tax Court was clearly correct. Unless the land on which improvements 
are or will be located is excluded from a deductible conservation easement, the 
easement deed will impose restrictions on the improvements. A conservation 
easement deed generally will include an overarching restriction that requires any 
use of the land—including the maintenance or construction of improvements on the 
land—to be consistent with the conservation purposes of the donation and not 
harmful to the specific conservation interests associated with the land.138 The deed 
also generally will impose additional restrictions on individual improvements, as in 
Belair. To provide additional examples, permitted permanent structures, such as 
single-family residences, guest houses, and agricultural structures, are generally 
subject to number, location, size, and height restrictions, as well as restrictions on 
their replacement or expansion; there may be limits or prohibitions on paving 
access roads or driveways and square footage limitations on other impermeable 
surfaces; and fencing may be restricted in numerous ways, including its location 
and type, such as requiring that it be wildlife-friendly.139 Restrictions on 
improvements are integral to a conservation easement; they are key to protecting 
the specific conservation interests associated with the land and accomplishing the 
conservation purpose of the easement.  
The Tax Court in Belair also explained that including the value attributable 
to improvements in the post-extinguishment proceeds to be shared by the donee is 
consistent with a commonsense understanding of the language in the proceeds 
regulation, which refers to the proceeds from the sale, exchange, or involuntary 
conversion “of the subject property.”140 The court explained that owners of real 
estate do not typically sell roads, driveways, ponds, or buried utility lines separately 
from the real estate on which those improvements are situated.141 If the property is 
sold, the sales proceeds are necessarily attributable both to the land and any 
 
136 Id.  
137 Id. at *16. 
138 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(1) (the “interest in the property retained by the donor (and the 
donor’s successors in interest) must be subject to legally enforceable restrictions . . . that will prevent 
uses of the retained interest inconsistent with the conservation purposes of the donation”); id. § 
1.170A-14(e)(2)-(3) (the terms of the easement must not permit uses that are destructive of 
conservation interests, subject to one limited exception). 
139 See, e.g., Fencing With Wildlife in Mind, Colorado Division of Wildlife (Dec. 2009), available 
at https://wildlifefriendly.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/fencingwithwildlifeinmind_coloradodow.pdf.  
140 Belair Woods, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-112, at *16, n. 6. 
141 Id. 
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attached improvements.142 The same is true for structures, such as residences, guest 
houses, barns, and fencing. That is, owners of real estate do not typically sell such 
structures separately from the real estate on which they are situated.  
 
D. Bright-Line Rule 
 
In a few cases involving conservation easement deeds that provide for 
subtraction of the value attributable to improvements before calculating the donee’s 
percentage of post-extinguishment proceeds, taxpayers have argued that the 
subtraction language is “effectively a nullity” or “empty verbiage” because the 
easements permit only limited future improvements and those improvements would 
either not increase the value of the subject property or any such increase would be 
“truly de minimis.”143 The Tax Court, in Orders, ruled that those assertions are 
plausible and denied the IRS’s motions for summary judgment on the issue.144 The 
improvements permitted by the easements involved in these cases include, for 
example, a trail for use by hikers and bicyclists on 42-acres, small recreational-only 
structures, fire breaks, drainage ditches, and gravel and other permeable-surfaced 
roads.145 
There are a number of problems with the approach to the proceeds 
regulation adopted in these Orders. First, as the Tax Court stated in Belair Woods, 
LLC v. Commissioner in response to the supposed-worthlessness-of-improvements 
argument, “[i]t is hard to understand why the draftsperson would have included this 
language if [the taxpayer] had believed that its anticipated improvements would not 
enhance the property’s value.”146 In the case of the easements at issue in the Orders, 
as just one example, “forestry” is permitted and forest roads can be particularly 
valuable improvements.147 Second, it is not clear what would constitute a “truly de 
 
142 Id. 
143 St. Andrews Plantation, LLC v. Commissioner, Tax Court Order, Docket No. 20849-17, at 13, 
14 (Nov. 16, 2020); Oconee Landing Property, LLC v. Commissioner, Tax Court Order, Docket No. 
11814-19, at 6 (Aug. 18, 2020). 
144 St. Andrews Plantation, Tax Court Order, Docket No. 20849-17, at 14; Oconee Landing 
Property, Tax Court Order, Docket No. 11814-19, at 6. 
145 St. Andrews Plantation, Tax Court Order, Docket No. 20849-17, at 6-7; Oconee Landing 
Property, Tax Court Order, Docket No. 11814-19, at 3. 
146 Belair Woods, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-112 *17. The court in Belair  explained: 
It is true that money spent to improve property does not necessarily produce a dollar-for-
dollar increase in the FMV of the property. But it does not follow that a combination of 
roads, driveways, irrigation systems, water pipes, electric cables, and septic systems would 
have no effect on the FMV of the conserved area. Id. at *18, n.7. 
147 St. Andrews Plantation, Tax Court Order, Docket No. 20849-17, at 6; Oconee Landing Property, 
Tax Court Order, Docket No. 11814-19, at 3. See, e.g., Deborah A. Layton, et al., Cost Estimators 
for Construction of Forest Roads in Central Appalachians, USDA, Forest Service Research Paper 
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minimis” increase in value. Different revenue agents and courts might come to 
different conclusions on the matter, leading to inconsistent and inequitable 
enforcement of the proceeds regulation.   
Third, as Tax Court explained in Red Oak Estates, LLC v. Commissioner:  
 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explicitly held that the 
proceeds regulation’s meaning is unambiguous as to improvements: Their 
value cannot be subtracted…. Here, the deed explicitly allows for 
improvements to be made to the property and allows any value derived from 
those improvements to be subtracted from the proceeds of a judicial 
extinguishment before the donee receives its share…. Whether those 
improvements will add value to the property at some point “in perpetuity” 
is an unknowable speculation and not a question of fact for this Court to 
address.148 
 
Given the perpetual life of a conservation easement and that an extinguishment 
might occur 75, 100, or 200 years following a donation, the potential value of future 
improvements is “unknowable speculation.” Revenue agents and the courts should 
not be required to speculate as to the value, at some remote and unknowable date 
in the future, of, for example, roads, trails, firebreaks, or recreational structures, or 
improvements that might be permitted via amendment.149  
The supposed-worthlessness-of-improvements argument is similar to the 
argument addressed in Mitchell v Commissioner, in which the Tenth Circuit held 
that failure to obtain a mortgage subordination agreement at the time of an 
easement’s donation was fatal to the deduction, despite the taxpayer’s argument 
that the risk of her defaulting on the mortgage (and the easement being 
extinguished) was so remote as to be negligible given her financial circumstances 
and credit history.150 The Tenth Circuit explained: “it is reasonable for the 
Commissioner to adopt an easily-applied subordination requirement over a case-
by-case, fact-specific inquiry into the financial strength or credit history of each 
 
NE-665, 1 (“The construction of forest roads is the most expensive and time-consuming task 
involved in forest operations”). 
148 Red Oak Estates, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-116, at *14-*15. See also Belair 
Woods, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-112 *17, n. 7 (“[the taxpayer] can only speculate 
about the future value of the specific improvements it has retained the right to make but has not yet 
made”). 
149 On amendments to conservation easements, see, e.g., Pine Mountain Preserve, LLLP v. 
Commissioner, 978 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir. 2020); Chief Counsel Advisory AM 2020-001 (March 27, 
2020); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Amendment Clauses in Easements: Ensuring Protection in 
Perpetuity, 168 TAX NOTES FEDERAL 819 (August 3, 2020). Pine Mountain Preserve is controlling 
in the Eleventh Circuit, which encompasses Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. 
150 Mitchell v. Commissioner, 775 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 2015). 
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taxpayer.”151 It was similarly reasonable for the Commissioner to adopt an easily-
applied proceeds requirement over a case-by-case, fact-specific and inherently 
speculative inquiry into the nature and value of possible future improvements. The 
IRS reviews millions of tax returns each year for audit potential, and bright-line 
rules, like the mortgage subordination and proceeds requirements, help to make that 
process manageable. Accordingly, a conservation easement deed that provides for 
the subtraction of the value attributable to improvements before calculating the 
donee’s share of post-extinguishment proceeds should not be eligible for a 
deduction. Taxpayers who are denied deductions on this ground can seek redress 
from the easement’s draftsperson. 
 
E. Enforcement is Critical 
 
In a recent case involving the denial of a § 170(h) deduction for failure to 
comply with the proceeds regulation, Tax Court Judge Holmes made some 
statements regarding § 170(h) and the Treasury Regulations that are concerning and 
warrant comment.152 He stated that, in recent years, the Commissioner has 
“attacked” a popular form of charitable contribution—the donation of conservation 
easements.153 He suggested that cases involving challenges to deductions claimed 
under § 170(h) should be resolved “case-by-case in contests of valuation.”154 He 
also stated that the Tax Court majority’s holding that the proceeds regulation is 
valid “will likely deny any charitable deduction to hundreds or thousands of 
taxpayers who donated the conservation easements that protect perhaps millions of 
acres.”155 Those statements are concerning for a number of reasons.  
At two separate points in the past two decades, Congress has called upon 
the IRS to increase enforcement of the requirements of § 170(h) and the Treasury 
Regulations. The first call for stepped-up enforcement came after the Washington 
Post published a series of articles in 2003 and 2004 describing a variety of abuses 
in the nonsyndicated easement donation context.156 The second call for stepped-up 
 
151 Id. at 9. 
152 See Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-54 (Oakbrook I); 
Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, 154 T.C. No. 10 (2020) (Oakbrook II). In 
Oakbrook I, which was authored by Judge Holmes, the tax court sustained the IRS’s complete 
disallowance of a $9,545,000 deduction claimed for a conservation easement donation because the 
easement did not comply with the proceeds regulation. In Oakbrook II, in which Judge Homes 
dissented, the majority, consisting of twelve judges, held that the proceeds regulation was both 
procedurally and substantively valid.  
153 Oakbrook, T.C. Memo. 2020-54, at *1. 
154 Oakbrook, 154 T.C. at 126. 
155 Id. at 82. 
156 For some of the articles describing abuses, see, e.g., Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, 
Developers Find Payoff in Preservation, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2003, at A1, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/12/21/developers-find-payoff-in-
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enforcement was made more recently in response to the increase in abusive 
syndicated easement donation transactions.157 Accordingly, IRS enforcement 
efforts are not an “attack” on conservation easement donations. Rather, they are 
congressionally-encouraged attempts to curb abuses and ensure public benefit in 
this partial interest donation context. The attack on conservation easements is more 
 
preservation/8add5325-7f4a-41ad-88ad-55aa1ca8bdf0/; Joe Stephens, For Owners of Upscale 
Homes, Loophole Pays; Pledging to Retain the Facade Affords a Charitable Deduction, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 12, 2004, at A1, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/12/12/for-
owners-of-upscale-homes-loophole-pays/1957fc0f-44ad-45c1-8ac6-0b6fe85dc17d/; Joe Stephens, 
Local Laws Already Bar Alterations, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2004, at A15, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/12/12/local-laws-already-bar-
alterations/aacd9e52-9757-47eb-92e2-0657bd219d42/; Joe Stephens, Tax Break Turns Into Big 
Business, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2004, at A1, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/12/13/tax-break-turns-into-big-
business/1097faeb-e789-4a22-b22c-e74ba9a48844/. On Congress’s response, see, e.g., Joe 
Stephens & David B. Ottaway, IRS Toughens Scrutiny of Land Gifts, WASH. POST, July 1, 2004, at 
A1 (the Senate Finance Committee began investigating easement transactions in 2003 and 
Committee Chairman Charles E. Grassley stated “the investigation's findings so far demand … 
stronger enforcement by the IRS”), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/07/01/irs-toughens-scrutiny-of-land-
gifts/04677e57-810f-443d-9ef4-493544136b45/; Joe Stephens, Senators Vow to End Tax Break on 
Easements, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2004, at A3, (Senators Grassley and Baucus “called for the IRS 
to make audits of easement deductions a priority”), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A8794-2004Dec17.html; Joe Stephens, IRS Starts Team on Easement Abuses, WASH. 
POST, June 9, 2005 (reporting on a Senate Finance Committee hearing on conservation easement 
abuses), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/06/09/irs-starts-team-on-
easement-abuses/bce00d7f-5d12-40be-86c4-9876b58c85a7/; Options to Improve Tax Compliance 
and Reform Tax Expenditures, prepared by the Joint Committee on Taxation, JCS-2-05, 281 (Jan. 
27, 2005) (recommending a variety of reforms to Congress), 
https://www.jct.gov/publications/2005/jcs-2-05/; Report of Staff Investigation of The Nature 
Conservancy (Volume I), Executive Summary, U.S. Senate Committee on Finance (June 2005) 
(recommending that the IRS take a number of actions to address abuses), 
https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Prt109-27.pdf.  
157 In a recent bipartisan investigative report, the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the Senate 
Finance Committee concluded “the IRS has strong reason for taking enforcement action against 
syndicated conservation-easement transactions as it has to date … [and] … Congress, the IRS, and 
Department of the Treasury should take further action to preserve the integrity of the conservation-
easement tax deduction.” Senate Finance Committee Bipartisan Investigative Report, supra note 
10, at 4. See also, e.g., Richard Rubin & Brody Mullins, Land-Tax Deal Promoters Lobby Congress 
After IRS Crackdown, WALL ST. J. (March 28, 2017) (quoting Senator Ron Wyden: “the IRS must 
continue to work to ensure that this critical program does not fall victim to tax cheats whose only 
goal is to sell tax shelters to the highest bidder”), https://www.wsj.com/articles/land-tax-deal-
promoters-lobby-congress-after-irs-crackdown-1490717906; Finance Committee Releases Report 
on Syndicated Conservation-Easement Transactions, U.S. Senate Committee on Finance (Aug. 25, 
2020), at https://bit.ly/3m69N6T  (quoting Senator Ron Wyden: “cracking down on abusive 
syndicated conservation easements requires ensuring IRS has the resources and legal tools to do its 
job”). 
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properly viewed as coming from taxpayers, land trusts, and attorneys who represent 
them that seek to take advantage of the § 170(h) deduction while avoiding the 
conditions Congress imposed on the deduction to protect the public interest. 
Judge Holmes also appeared to suggest that the role of the IRS and the 
courts in the § 170(h) context should be limited to ensuring that a deductible 
easement is conveyed to a qualified organization and to checking value. However, 
as explained in Part II, that is precisely what Congress chose not to do when it 
enacted § 170(h). Congress deliberately did not rely on the status of the donee as a 
qualified organization to ensure that a deductible easement would be a restriction 
(granted in perpetuity) on the use that may be made of the real property, or that the 
easement would satisfy the conservation purposes test, or that the conservation 
purpose of the contribution would be protected in perpetuity. Rather, each of those 
requirements is separate and distinct and each must be satisfied independently of 
the qualified organization requirement. 
In addition, neither the status of donees as qualified organizations nor the 
accurate valuation of conservation easements would ensure that easements actually 
“protect” millions of acres. The level of protection that a conservation easement 
provides is largely dependent upon whether the easement is drafted to comply with 
the granted-in-perpetuity, conservation purpose, and protected-in-perpetuity 
requirements. For example, to comply with those requirements, the easement must 
not authorize uses that are inconsistent with the conservation purpose of the 
donation;158 the easement must not authorize uses that could injure or destroy the 
property’s specific conservation interests, with one limited exception;159 the 
easement, if it is an open space easement, must not permit a degree of intrusion or 
future development that would interfere with the essential scenic quality of the land 
or with the governmental conservation policy being furthered by the donation;160 
the easement must prohibit surface mining and any other method of mining that 
could harm conservation interests;161 the easement must prohibit its transfer except 
to other eligible donees that agree to continue to carry out the conservation purpose 
of the contribution;162 the easement must grant the donee the requisite notice, 
access, and enforcement rights;163 and the easement can be extinguishable only in 
a judicial proceeding upon a finding by the court of impossibility or impracticality, 
and the donee must be entitled to at least the specified minimum percentage of any 
post-extinguishment proceeds and must be required to use those proceeds in a 
 
158 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(1). 
159 Id. § 1.170A-14(e)(2)-(3). 
160 Id. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(v). 
161 I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(4). 
162 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1)-(2). 
163 Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(ii). 
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manner consistent with the conservation purposes of the original contribution.164 
Reducing compliance with § 170(h) to checking the status of the donee as a 
qualified organization and checking value would strip the section of these and other 
requirements, each of which was considered essential to the integrity and 
effectiveness of the deduction program.165 Moreover, valuation disputes present 
their own set of challenges.166 
Taxpayers also are not without tools to ensure compliance with § 170(h) 
requirements. In addition to the plain language of the proceeds regulation, before a 
donation is made, a taxpayer can obtain a private letter ruling from the IRS that the 
terms of the conservation easement deed comply with all requirements.167 In the 
reported cases to date in which deductions have been denied due to a noncompliant 
proceeds clause, the claimed deductions ranged from $1.2 million to $155.5 
million, with an average deduction of approximately $15.5 million.168 Ordinary 
 
164 Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i)-(ii). 
165 A deductible easement must also comply with the mortgage subordination and baseline 
documentation requirements. See id. § 1.170A-14(g)(2) and (5). 
166 See, e.g., Boltar v. Commissioner,  136 T.C. 326, 335 (2011) (“The problem is created by [the] 
willingness [of appraisers] to use their resumes and their skills to advocate the position of the party 
who employs them without regard to objective and relevant facts, contrary to their professional 
obligations”); Michael R. Devitt A Dip in the Hot Tub: Concurrent Evidence Techniques for Expert 
Witnesses in Tax Court Cases, 117 J. TAX’N 213 (2012) (“appearance of separately testifying 
government- and taxpayer-retained expert witnesses only perpetuates the enduring concerns of 
trustworthiness, partiality, and litigation lethargy while exacerbating the challenge of reaching the 
right results”). See also Lee A. Sheppard, Clamping Down on Conservation Easement Shelters, TAX 
NOTES FEDERAL, 1753, 1761 (“Valuation cases are a crapshoot, because a court could be enchanted 
by photos of a scenic plot of land”). 
167 A private letter ruling (PLR) is a written statement issued to a taxpayer that interprets and applies 
tax laws to the taxpayer’s specific set of facts. A PLR may not be relied on as precedent by other 
taxpayers or IRS personnel. PLRs are generally made public after all information has been removed 
that could identify the taxpayer to whom it was issued. See IRS, Understanding IRS Guidance – A 
Brief Primer, available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Understanding-IRS-Guidance-A-Brief-Primer. 
168 The claimed deduction amounts, largest to smallest, were as follows: Coal Prop. Holdings, LLC 
v. Commissioner, 153 T.C. 126 (2019) ($155,500,000); Plateau Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Memo. 2020-93 ($25,449,000); Glade Creek Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
2020-148 ($17,504,000); R.R. Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-22 
($16,000,000); PBBM-Rose Hill, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 900 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2018) ($15,160,000); 
Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-54 ($9,545,000); Woodland 
Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-55 ($8,703,000); Lumpkin HC, LLC v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-95 ($8,242,000); TOT Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Bench Op. (Dec. 13, 2019) ($6,900,000);  Maple Landing, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
2020-104 ($6,791,000); Smith Lake, LLC, v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-107 ($6,524,000); 
Vill. at Effingham, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-102 ($5,237,000); Belair Woods, LLC 
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-112 ($4,778,000); Englewood Place, LLC v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Memo. 2020-105 ($4,773,000); Cottonwood Place, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-
115 ($4,592,000); Red Oak Estates, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-116 ($4,343,000); 
Riverside Place, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-103 ($4,071,000); Hewitt v. 
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prudence suggests that taxpayers planning to claim such sizable deductions should 
have sought rulings from the IRS approving the conservation easement deeds 
before the donations were made. Seeking a private letter ruling would seem 
particularly appropriate in syndicated easement donation transactions, where 
interests are sold to investors and representations presumably are made regarding 




After § 170(h) was enacted in 1980, the Treasury faced a difficult 
problem—how to ensure, following extinguishment of a deductible perpetual 
conservation easement, that the conservation purpose of the contribution would be 
protected in perpetuity. Requiring that the donee receive proceeds equal to the value 
of the easement at the time of its extinguishment and use those proceeds for similar 
conservation purposes elsewhere would, at first glance, appear to be the most 
sensible solution. However, due to the persistent problem of overvaluation of 
easements at the time of their donation, that rule could lead to systematic 
underpayment of post-extinguishment proceeds to donees relative to the public 
investment made in the easements. It also would entail significant future valuation 
difficulties that would likely be resolved in a manner disadvantageous to donees 
and, by extension, the public. The proceeds regulation avoids those problems and 
provides additional benefits. 
By providing that the donee must be entitled to a percentage of any post-
extinguishment proceeds, rather than the dollar value of an easement at its donation, 
the proceeds regulation ensures that the donee will benefit from appreciation in the 
value of the property as a whole following the donation. In addition, an easement 
may appreciate in value relative to the property as a whole following its donation, 
and not subtracting the value attributable to improvements before calculating the 
donee’s percentage share of post-extinguishment proceeds can temper the perverse 
incentive property owners may have to seek extinguishment to benefit from that 
relative appreciation. Not subtracting the value attributable to improvements also 
avoids the future difficulties associated with valuing improvements or appreciation 
in the value thereof.  
The proceeds regulation also is not inherently unfair to donors or subsequent 
property owners. A variety of unpredictable variables can affect the amount of post-
extinguishment proceeds and, depending on the facts, the regulation can financially 
benefit donors and subsequent property owners. Furthermore, a conservation 
easement donation is a voluntary act, and a prospective easement donor who does 
not wish to comply with the proceeds regulation or any of the other conditions that 
 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-89 ($2,788,000); Lumpkin One Five Six, LLC v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Memo. 2020-94 ($2,483,000); Carroll v. Commissioner, 146 T.C. 196 (2016) ($1,200,000). 
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Congress and the Treasury imposed on the deduction to safeguard the public 
interest need not make the donation or need not claim the deduction. The purchase 
of property subject to a deductible conservation easement also is a voluntary act, 
and a prospective purchaser concerned about the division of post-extinguishment 
proceeds or other of the easement’s terms need not purchase the property, or could 
offer to pay a reduced purchase price to address any perceived risks or 
inconveniences. 
In sum, the proceeds regulation contains a simple and easy-to-implement 
rule: whenever a deductible easement is extinguished in whole or in part, the donee 
must be entitled to at least the specified minimum percentage of any post-
extinguishment proceeds and must use those proceeds to advance similar 
conservation purposes elsewhere. There is no need to grapple with appraisals, 
opposing interests, or other difficult valuation issues. The rule also is neither 
irrational nor inherently unfair. Considered in light of the unpredictable variables, 
the alternatives, the potential incentive on the part of property owners to seek 
extinguishments, and the goal of protecting the public investment in conservation, 
the proceeds regulation provides a reasonable solution to the difficult problem of 
ensuring that the conservation purpose of a contribution will be protected in 
perpetuity.  
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